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ABSTRACT
Congress enacted legislation in 1978 [Revenue Act 
of 1978] that created a new type of retirement plan, the 
simplified employee plan. Congress believed that the 
administration costs associated with existing plans, 
especially qualified plans, were an undesirable obstacle 
to plan adoption and maintenance among small employers. 
Qualified plan participants, i.e., employees, in many 
cases are able to receive substantial reductions in the 
amount of tax due on retirement plan distributions. One 
of the primary differences between qualified plans and 
the simplified employee plans mentioned above is that 
under certain circumstances the tax due on distributions 
from qualified plans may be computed using a special 
federal averaging computation. Some states allow 
similar tax relief for distributions from qualified
retirement arrangements. simplified employee plans do 
not qualify for this preferential federal tax treatment. 
Therefore, even if simplified employee plans reduce the 
administration costs incurred by employers, the amount 
actually available to plan participants after taxes 
under a simplified employee plan may bp substantially 
lower than the amount available to participants in 
qualified retirement plans. This paper describes a 
computer simulation of the costs small employers incur 
to provide after-tax retirement benefits to employees. 
These costs were analyzed to determine if simplified 
employee plans actually lowered the costs small 
employers incur. In this study, the after-tax costs 
small employers incur under both qualified plans and 
simplified employee plans were compared to determine if 
the creation of simplified employee plans achieved the 
congressional objective of cost reduction for small 
employers. Of particular interest were the tax costs 
small employers incur because of the various methods of 
taxing plan participants at the state level.
x
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Retirement plan assets are a significant component 
of aggregate investment in the United States, and the 
continued growth of retirement plan assets may have 
broad, long-range implications for the national economy 
and for state and local economies.* Congress enacted 
legislation in 1978 [Revenue Act of 1978] that created 
a new type of retirement plan, the simplified employee 
plan. Congress believed that the administration costs 
associated with existing plans, especially qualified 
plans, were an undesirable obstacle to plan adoption and 
maintenance among small employers:
^-See, Economic Committee [1964] (discussion of the 
social and economic effects of retirement arrangements, 
especially on savings and investment and the mobility of 
labor and capital) and Berle [1959] (discussion of the 
effects of power concentration in the hands of a few 
individuals or institutions who do not actually own 
substantial amounts of property).
1
The committee is aware that many 
qualified pension plans have been terminated 
in the recent past due, in part, to the 
complex and burdensome rules they are 
required to satisfy. The committee believes 
that these rules have also had the effect of 
retarding the introduction of new plans. The 
committee is concerned that, because of the 
expense [emphasis added] and effort required 
to comply with present rules for tax qualified 
plans, many employees, particularly the 
employees of small businesses [emphasis 
added], will not earn employer-provided 
retirement benefits [S. Rept. No. 1263].
In many cases, qualified plan participants, i.e.,
employees, are required to pay a tax on plan
distributions that is substantially less than the tax
that would have been due on similar distributions from
simplified employee plan. Indeed, one of the primary
differences between qualified plans and simplified
employee plans is that under certain circumstances
employees may compute the tax due on distributions from
qualified plans using a special federal averaging
method. Some states allow similar tax relief for
distributions from qualified retirement arrangements.
Because simplified employee plans do not receive this
preferential federal tax treatment, the amount actually
available to plan participants after employee taxes are
deducted may be substantially lower under a simplified
employee plan than under a qualified retirement plan.
The question is, did the creation of a new type of
retirement plan, the simplified employee plan, actually
lower employer costs, thereby making employers more
3likely to offer retirement benefits to their employees? 
Plan administration costs may be lower for simplified 
employee plans than for qualified plans, but the cost of 
paying after-tax benefits to employees may not have been 
reduced.
This cost, i.e., the cost of paying after-tax 
retirement benefits, seems relevant because the intent 
of Congress was for employees to "earn employer-provided 
retirement benefits." That is, Congress's purpose for 
creating simplified employee plans was to place benefits 
into the hands of employees, not to lower plan 
administration costs. Apparently, Congress believed 
that lowering plan administration costs would lower the 
cost employers incur to provide plan benefits. The 
answer to the question posed above turns on whether the 
tax benefits available to plan participants under 
qualified plans outweigh the lower administration costs 
associated with simplified employee plans.
As an example, suppose an employee participated in 
an employer-sponsored qualified plan for ten years and 
that during each year of plan participation the employer 
made a plan contribution of five percent of the 
employee's $30,000 annual salary or an annual 
contribution of $1,500. If these annual contributions 
earned a ten percent rate of return they would result in 
a pre-tax, lump sum distribution to the employee of
4$23,906, Assume that in addition to the $1,500 annual 
contributions, the employer paid $ 2 0 0  per year in plan 
administration costs that were attributable to the 
employee. That is, the employer could cause the 
employee to receive a $23,906 pre-tax lump sum payment 
by making ten annual payments of $1,700.
If a simplified employee plan had been adopted by 
the employer the same pre-tax lump sum payment could 
have been made by contributing only $1,500 per year, 
assuming no plan administration costs for simplified 
employee plans. If the entire $1,700 per year had been 
invested in a simplified employee plan that earned ten 
percent, the employer would receive a pre-tax, lump sum 
distribution of $27,094. That is, as a result of a 
$1,700 annual contribution the employee would receive a 
pre-tax, lump sum distribution of $23,906 if the 
employer adopted a qualified plan or $27,094 if the 
employer adopted a simplified employee plan.
Congress's intent was to put benefits into the 
hands of employees, not just to lower plan 
administration costs. Clearly, administration costs 
could be lowered in this example by adopting a 
simplified plan, but at what cost to the employee? If 
the employee in this example is assumed to have $5,000 
per year of taxable income, in addition to any lump sum 
retirement arrangement distribution, the employee will
pay a tax of $1,643 on the plan distribution if the 
federal averaging computation for qualified plans is 
elected . 2  If a simplified employee plan were adopted 
the employee would not be allowed to use the special 
averaging method to compute the federal income tax, and 
the tax on a $27,094 pre-tax, lump sum distribution 
would be $ 6 , 2  06.3
The result under the facts assumed is that an 
employer's annual contribution of $1,700 would yield 
$22,263 (i.e., $23,906 - $1,643) after paying the
federal income tax if the employer adopts a qualified 
plan or $20,888 (i.e., $27,094 - $6,206) if the employer
adopts a simplified employee plan.
Under these circumstances, the employee would be 
better off if the employer adopted a qualified plan. 
However, if the facts were slightly different, a 
simplified employee plan could result in more after-tax 
employee benefit. For example, assume that all facts 
are the same as above except that the employee has no 
taxable income after plan separation and files a joint 
return. Under these circumstances, the employee would 
pay a tax of $1,643 if a qualified plan were adopted and
2In this case, ten year forward averaging and 1986 
tax rates were used to compute the tax. Chapter 4 
describes the availability of this and other methods for 
computing the federal tax on plan distributions.
3This tax was based on 1986 tax rates and assumes 
that the taxpayer was single.
6$3,876 if a simplified employee plan were adopted. The 
after-tax, lump sum benefit would be $22,263 (i.e., 
$23,906 - $1,643) under a qualified plan or $23,218 
(i.e., $27,094 - $3,876) under a simplified employee 
p l a n . Table 1-1 summarizes the results of the examples 
above.
The preceding examples have ignored the effect of 
any state income tax on plan distributions. State 
income taxes cause the differences between qualified 
plans and simplified employee plans to be greater in 
many cases. For example, some states tax distributions 
from simplified employee plans as ordinary income and 
allow some qualified plan distributions to escape 
taxation completely . 4
This paper describes a computer simulation of the 
costs small employers incur to provide after-tax, lump 
sum retirement benefits to employees. These costs were 
analyzed to determine if simplified employee plans 
actually lowered the costs small employers incur to 
provide after-tax dollars of lump sum retirement 
benefits. In this study, the after-tax costs small 
employers incurred under both qualified plans and 
simplified employee plans were compared to determine if 
the creation of simplified employee plans achieved the
4See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of how 
states tax plan distributions.
7congressional objective of cost reduction for small 
employers.
The first three sections of this chapter examine 
briefly certain conceptual and economic issues and 
provide a summary of retirement arrangement taxation. 
Next, the research questions addressed by this study are 
presented and are followed by a section that describes 
the method used to answer the research questions. The 
method section is followed by a section on study 
limitations and assumptions. The final section in this 
chapter discusses the contributions of this study.
In the chapters that follow, each of the above 
topics is discussed in more detail. Chapters 2, 3, and 
4 address conceptual issues, economic issues, and 
retirement arrangement taxation, respectively.
Chapter 5 describes the method used to answer the 
research questions, and Chapter 6  reports the results of 
the study. Chapter 7 presents some conclusions based on 
the results of this study and indicates some areas that 
appear to be productive areas for future research.
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
Crucial to the issue of retirement arrangement cost 
is the proposition, which has been extensively studied 
and discussed by other researchers, that employer 
payments to retirement arrangements a r e , indeed, costs.
8Pension benefits were originally viewed as gratuities 
from employers [Pesando and Rea, 1977 and McGill,
1984]. This approach, however, is inconsistent with 
economic theory and practice, and De Roode [1913 ] 
offered another theory in which pensions were treated as 
one part of a compensation package. This deferred 
compensation theory has since been replaced or 
supplemented by other theories because, as Stone [1982] 
observed, deferred wage theory does not provide a 
satisfactory explanation for at least three empirically 
observable situations:
1. deferred vesting provisions are present in 
many plans;
2 . many firms integrate pension benefits with 
social security benefits; and
3. some United States and Canadian firms make 
unilateral, upward adjustments in the pen.ions 
of retired employees.
Option pricing theory and agency theory have been 
used to give more rigorous explanations of pension 
behavior [e.g., Treynor, Regan, and Priest, 1976 and 
Logue, 1979]. Option pricing theory requires that 
employees place a value, at least implicitly, on 
conditional future payments as if employees purchased an 
option on future benefits. Of course, such an 
approach, if done explicitly, would involve a complex 
weighing of individual utility functions and probability 
estimates.
9Agency theory has been used [Logue, 1979] to 
explain a variety of behavior patterns. For example, 
why would employers, employees, and investors choose 
uncertain future payments in exchange for certain 
current payments? One possible explanation is that 
certain costs may be reduced if future payments, which 
include an adjustment for the amount of time until 
payment, are used. Each of the above conceptual 
difficulties will be treated at greater length in the 
next chapter.
ECONOMIC ISSUES
Federal and state tax policies have played an 
important role in bringing about the current level of 
emphasis on retirement arrangements by both employers 
and employees [S e e , Lewellen, 197 5; Galper and 
Zimmerman, 1977; Feldstein, 1976; Fredland et al.,
1968; Romans and Ganti, 1979; Eaton and Rosen, 1980; 
Keeley, 1980; Hemming, 1980 ; and Brannigan, 1985].
However, the exact nature of the role of taxation is not 
known.
This is true especially in the case of small 
businesses and local economies. For example, increased 
investment in a state economy may only displace other 
investments. Most of the research to date that has been 
concerned with the effects of state and local taxation
10
has focused on explanations for interjurisdictional 
differences in economic variables instead of 
explanations for the aggregate level of economic 
variables. This emphasis probably is due to the 
relative difficulty of explaining the aggregate prices 
of capital, labor, and other economic variables.
Many of Due's [1961] early observations concerning 
interjurisdictional tax differentials appear to remain 
true today, and there seems to be no reason to doubt 
that these observations apply to retirement plan tax 
differentials. First, even relatively high state and 
local tax levels, acting alone, do not appear to have 
the drastic effects on firm behavior that might be 
predicted on the basis of casual observations of 
taxation differences among jurisdictions* Second, tax 
considerations may have an effect on firm location 
decisions if most or all of the other relevant factors 
are equal. For example, lower property taxes might 
cause a firm to locate in a state if the alternative is 
a neighboring state with similar levels of other taxes. 
Finally, certain areas might be excluded from 
consideration by a firm because of a general perception 
that the area does not have a healthy business 
environment. This means that in some cases all 
available alternatives may not be evaluated because of
11
the initial screening process for suitable business 
locations.
RETIREMENT PLAN TAXATION
Under current federal tax laws, much variation 
exists in the amount of tax an employee must pay as a 
result of a retirement arrangement distribution.
Several methods are available to compute the federal and 
state income tax due on a plan distribution: some are
elective and some are mandatory. The degree of 
flexibility afforded taxpayers, generally, is a function 
of the type of plan from which a distribution was made 
and the manner of payment.
At the federal level, distributions from a 
qualified plan are taxable as capital gain if 
attributable to pre-1974 service. Any remaining 
qualified plan distributions are treated as ordinary 
income and are taxed under rules applicable to 
annuities. If all qualified plan benefits are received 
within one taxable year a special ten-year forward 
averaging method was available to compute the tax, prior 
to 1987, on any ordinary income components of plan 
distributions. Taxpayers were allowed to elect to treat 
the entire amount of a qualified lump-sum distribution 
as ordinary income under the old ten-year averaging 
rules, forgoing the benefit of capital gain treatment
12
for distributions attributable to pre-1974 service.
After 1985 a five-year averaging computation is 
available. Taxpayers who were 50 years old on or before 
January 1, 1986 may elect to be taxed under either the 
old ten-year forward averaging rules or the new 
five-year forward averaging rules.
Simplified employee plans and individual retirement 
accounts are treated identically for most federal tax 
purposes. For example, distributions from these two 
plans do not qualify for the special averaging 
computations and are taxed, generally, as ordinary 
income as received by employees. Individual retirement 
accounts may be used to avoid current taxation on 
qualified plan distributions if a taxpayer properly 
transfers assets from a qualified plan in a partial or 
complete rollover.
A variety of state tax policies exist with respect 
to plan distributions, ranging from no state taxation to 
ordinary income treatment [See, Curatola, 1986]. Both 
federal and state taxation of plan distributions are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The above summary of the rules related to 
retirement plan taxation considered the taxation of 
retirement plan distributions only from an employee
13
point of view. From an employer's point of view, the 
federal and state tax treatment of both simplified 
employee plans and qualified plans are fairly 
consistent. Employer contributions to a retirement plan 
generally are deductible, and any plan earnings are 
allowed to accumulate without the imposition of an 
income tax. The purpose of this study is to investigate 
the effects of plan type and state tax policy on the 
cost small employers incur to provide certain after-tax 
employee benefits. This investigation will take into 
account the economic variables, and their corresponding 
frequency distributions, that determine plan cost. The 
following research questions were examined:
1. Does retirement plan type affect the cost 
small employers incur to provide 
after-tax retirement benefits to 
employees?
2. Does state income tax policy with respect 
to retirement arrangements affect the 
cost small employers incur to provide 
after-tax retirement benefits to 
employees?
The first research question is primarily a federal 
tax issue concerning the effectiveness of simplified 
employee plans as a method for reducing small employer 
costs. The second question addresses, at once, a 
federal tax policy issue and a state tax policy issue. 
That is, state tax policies could cause inconsistent, 
inefficient, or ineffective implementation of federal 
tax policies. The economic effects of state tax
14
policies have consequences for individual states as 
w e l l .
METHOD
A model was defined that describes the way inputs 
to retirement arrangements result in employer costs and 
employee benefits. In the system, employers were 
assumed to make contributions to retirement arrangements 
over some period of employee plan participation. Then, 
employees were assumed to withdraw the employer 
contributions, along with any earnings, in a lump sum. 
The model provides an index of the average cost to 
employers of paying lump sum, after-tax dollars to 
employees in three categories of states and under three 
types of retirement arrangements.
The Model
The problem was to determine the amount of 
employer contribution, i.e., cost, required to provide 
after-tax benefits to employees, taking into account the 
fact that employers and employees have certain 
attributes which affect the employer contributions 
required to pay after-tax benefits. The model also had 
to reflect the fact that employer and employee 
attributes have some probability of occurrence. Simply 
stated, the cost employers incur to provide retirement 
benefits is a function of many variables: some
15
variables can be viewed as characteristics of employers, 
for example the number of plan participants^, and some 
variables can be viewed as characteristics of employees 
who receive plan distributions, for example the amount 
of taxable income employees receive from sources other 
than retirement arrangements . 6  The model used in this 
study is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, but a 
short description of the model is presented below.
If an individual employer and an individual 
employee are examined for a given plan type and state 
tax policy, a cost function, C, can be defined such that 
C is an index of after-tax plan cost. In the model used 
for this study the index of after-tax plan cost is a
5The number of plan participants could be expected 
to affect plan cost in at least two ways. Fixed plan 
administration costs decrease on a per employee basis as 
the number of plan participants increases. Variable 
plan administration costs increase total administration 
costs incurred by an employer as the number of plan 
participants increases but remain constant on a per 
employee basis as the number of plan participants 
increases.
6Employee taxable income from sources other than 
the retirement plan under consideration affects the cost 
employers incur to provide after-tax plan benefits 
because of the progressive nature of the United States 
income tax system. For example, a $2 pre-tax plan 
distribution would be required to pay an employee $ 1  of 
after-tax plan benefit if the employee were taxed at a 
rate of 50 percent on plan distributions. A plan 
distribution of $1.25 would result in a $1 plan benefit 
to an employee in a 2 0  percent marginal tax bracket. 
Because total taxable income determines an employee1s 
marginal tax rate, taxable income from all sources must 
be considered in the computation of employer after-tax 
c o s t .
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ratio, the numerator of which is the sum of all 
employer contributions to a retirement arrangement, 
including the payment of plan administration costs, and 
the denominator is the after-tax payments to employees 
that result from employer contributions. If R is 
defined to be a function that describes employer 
contributions, in future value terms on the date of 
distribution, and if G is defined to be a function which 
describes the resulting after-tax distributions, then C 
can be represented in the following manner:
R (a ^ , (*2 » ••• i i 0 x i 0 2 »
c =   (1-1)
G (oti, £*2 1 ^ m f 01' 02 • * ■ ■ 0 n ')
where
c = an index of the cost of
providing after-tax benefits to 
employees;
R = the functional relationship
between the future value at the 
date of distribution of all 
employer contributions and two 
types of variables:
1 ) employer characteristics qi 
to am and 2 ) employee 
characteristics 0 i to 0 n
G = the functional relationship
between the after-tax amounts 
received by employees and two 
types of variables:
1 ) employer characteristics 
to am and 2 ) employee 
characteristics to 0n
oti, e 2 / . . .am = employer characteristics 1 , 2 ,
. * . , m
0 1 ' 0 2 ' - **0 n = employee characteristics 1 , 2 ,
• • • a n t
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Design
A nested design was used to answer the research 
questions, plan type and state income tax policy being 
the factors of interest. The observations were the cost 
indices of providing after-tax employee benefits under 
three retirement arrangements in three state income tax 
categories.
Plan Type Factor. The plan type factor was 
examined at three levels. The research question 
addressed by the plan type factor was directed at the 
differences in employer costs for simplified employee 
plans and qualified plans. Qualified plans, however, 
are so varied that discovering a representative cost for 
such plans was thought to be impossible. Therefore, two 
levels of the plan type factor were used, one a low cost 
qualified plan alternative and one a high cost qualified 
plan alternative. The third level of the plan type 
factor included simplified employee plans.
State Tax Policy Factor. Three levels of the state 
tax policy factor were examined. The first state tax 
policy level included states with no income tax. This 
level, obviously, represented an extreme method of 
taxing distributions and served as a control group to 
determine if other state tax policies significantly 
affect the cost of providing employee benefits. Many
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states fall into this category . 7  The second level of 
the state tax policy factor included states that tax 
plan distributions as ordinary income at regular state 
income tax rates. The third level of the state tax 
policy factor included state tax policies that fall 
between the extremes of the first two levels . 8  
Procedure
The procedure for gathering data on small employer 
costs was to simulate responses, i.e., costs, based on 
empirical and theoretical frequency distributions for 
the input variables a lf a2 , am , P\> P2• **** and
0n. The use of empirical variable distributions does 
not assure a good approximation of the true underlying 
distribution, but this method is generally thought to be 
the best course of action in the absence of evidence 
about a true variable distribution [Conover, 1980).
Data Analysis
Because the responses were determined in a random 
manner, statistical testing of the responses was 
appropriate [See, Cochran and Cox, 1957; Kleijner,
7 Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, 
Washington, and Wyoming do not have an individual income 
tax. New Hampshire and Tennessee tax only interest and 
dividends (i.e., distributions from retirement 
arrangements are not taxed in these states).
8For a detailed discussion of retirement plan 
taxation at the state level, see Curatola', 1986.
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1975; and Naylor, 1969]. The following model was used 
to test for the significance of factors:
c ijk = U + S£ + pj(i) + ek (ij) (1-2)
where
Cijfc = the cost index of the kth
observation for plan type j in 
state tax policy i,
U = the overall mean effect,
Si = the effect of the ith level of
factor S, the state tax policy 
effect,
Pj(i) = the effect of the jth level of
factor P, the plan type factor 
effect, within state tax policy i, 
and
ek(ij) = rantioin error present in the
kth observation for plan type j 
in state tax policy i.
LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This study relied heavily upon two assumptions 
about lump sum distributions paid to the employees of 
small businesses. The first assumption is that 
retirement plan costs incurred by employers are affected 
by federal and state taxes imposed on employees. To the 
extent that this assumption was not appropriate, the 
conclusions that may be drawn from the results of this 
study are limited.
The second basic assumption concerned the 
definition of small employers, the intended 
beneficiaries of simplified employee plans. The answers
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to the research questions may have been affected by 
which employers were considered small. To the extent 
that small employers and their employees have 
characteristics different from those used in the 
simulation of plan costs, the appropriateness of 
drawing conclusions about the population of small 
employers is limited.
CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
The contributions of this study have been alluded 
to in the discussion above. Knowledge was gained about 
how federal and state tax policies affect employer costs 
and whether Congress accomplished its stated objective 
by establishing simplified employee plans. The results 
of this study may find application in the evaluation of 
present federal tax policies and in the development of 
strategies to affect state labor forces, investment, and 
employment opportunities.
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Plan
Type
TABLE 1-1 
PLAN COST EXAMPLES
After-
Total tax
Annual Pre-tax Plan
Other Filing Plan Distri- Federal Distri-
Income Status Cost bution Tax bution
QP
SEP
QP
SEP
$5,000 Single $1,700
5,000 Single 1,700
0 Joint 1,700
0 Joint 1,700
$23,906 $1,643
27.094 6,206
23,906 1,643
27.094 3,876
$22,263 
20,888 
22,263 
23,218
The computations above were based on the following 
assumptions:
a plan participation period of 1 0  years and 
a 1 0  percent annual return on plan assets.
CHAPTER 2
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS
The purpose of this study was to investigate 
certain characteristics of employer retirement plan 
costs. However as mentioned in Chapter 1 a basic 
premise of this study is that the contributions 
employers make to retirement arrangements represent an 
additional cost of doing business. This chapter is a 
brief review of selected attempts to describe the 
theoretical foundations of retirement arrangements . 9  
The evolution of retirement arrangement theory from the 
early theories, which viewed post-retirement payments by 
employers as acts of berevolerce. to the more complex 
theories of today, which are often represented by 
mathematically rigorous explanations of employer and
9Stone (1982) presented an excellent summary of the 
literature in this area making a brief review sufficient 
h e r e .
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employee behavior, indicates that retirement 
arrangement payments by employers reasonably can be 
viewed as a cost incurred by employers. An 
understanding of some attempts to explain the 
theoretical basis for retirement plans may aid in the 
application and interpretation of the results obtained 
from this study.
THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE PENSIONS
The first well-known United States private pension 
program was adopted by American Express in 1875, 
preceding the Social Security Act of 193 5 by about 60 
years [Jackson, 1977]. A number of railroads, public 
utilities, and banks followed by adopting mainly 
noncontributory plans . 1 0  By 1930, 420 plans had been 
adopted by private industry [Jackson, 1977].
As might be expected, most of the early private 
pension plans were established by large organizations. 
The plans usually formalized firm practices with respect 
to retired or disabled employees and their families. 
Although length of service has been a common thread in 
the fabric of private pension programs, other factors 
have been used to calculate employee benefits over the
10Retirement arrangements can be classified on the 
basis of their contributory or noncontributory nature. 
Contributory plans are those plans to which employees 
contribute. Noncontributory plans are plans to which 
only employers contribute.
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years, and the emphasis placed on such factors has 
shifted from time to time . 1 1
During the first half of the twentieth century, 
organized labor became a major factor in the development 
of retirement plans, but at first, labor leaders were 
suspicious of formal plans. Some labor organizers saw 
pension plans as a way for management to buy employee 
loyalty and undermine union influence while holding 
wages at low levels [McGill, 1984]. Ultimately, 
organized labor played a key role in forcing employers 
to include retirement benefits in the list of items to 
be negotiated.
In 1946 a grievance was filed with the National 
Labor Relations Board alleging that Inland Steel Company 
had violated the terms of a labor contract by enforcing 
a policy of mandatory retirement at age 65. The problem 
arose because Inland Steel refused to negotiate the 
matter, asserting that the mandatory retirement policy 
was part of the company's pension plan and not part of 
any collective bargaining agreement.
The National Labor Relations Board rInland steel 
Company. 1948] did not agree with management and ruled 
that under the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
11For example, Jackson (197 7) pointed out that the 
compensation used by most employers to determine 
benefits shifted from final average pay to career pay 
around 1940 and then back to final average pay around 
1975.
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the pension plan provisions were subject to negotiation 
and that management could not take unilateral action in 
this area. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the National Labor Board's ruling fInland 
Steel Company• 1949]. The court found that a pension 
plan is a condition of employment, but the court would 
not go so far as to equate pension plan benefits with 
wa g e s . Treatment of pension plans as a condition of 
employment was enough to force pension plans into the 
mainstream of labor negotiations and to prohibit many 
employers from altering or terminating pension plans 
without submitting the matter to collective bargaining 
units.
The introduction of the current social security 
system required major changes in the way employers 
viewed private pension benefits. Whereas private 
pension plans seemed to discharge a moral obligation of 
the employer or some earned right of the employee, the 
social security provisions appeared to address, 
primarily, the need for income, a social problem . 1 2  
Private pension plans assumed a role secondary to the 
social security system. According to Jackson [1977],
12While the social security system does take into 
account the amount of taxes paid into the system, the 
system's primary emphasis is on need. Also, the present 
social security system is very broad with respect to 
participation and is, for the most part, a nonvoluntary 
system.
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the most commonly stated reasons for maintaining private 
pension plans after the introduction of the current 
social security system were those listed below:
1. Discharge a moral obligation of the 
employer
2 . Permit the retirement of inefficient 
workers while retaining older 
skilled workers who are still 
efficient
3. Attract capable, well trained, new 
employees
4. Maintain a favorable working climate
5. Develop a good corporate image
6 . Develop a more efficient working 
relationship with a union by putting 
long-term problems on the bargaining 
table
7. Reduce the employee's total 
dependence on government to a more 
manageable level, and
8 . Utilize a tax advantage [Jackson,
1977, p. 18].
Explanations for specific levels of pension 
benefits requires a more complex theoretical structure. 
No such structure has been described and tested fully, 
but the following sections of this chapter summarize 
attempts to develop a theoretical framework for 
retirement arrangements.
GRATUITIES AND DEFERRED WAGES
Pension benefits were originally viewed as 
gratuities from employers [Pesando and Rea, 1977 and
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McGill, 1984], but as Stone [1982] pointed out, this 
view is inconsistent with economic theory and practice. 
De Roode [1913] offered another theory in which the 
pension component of compensation was viewed as only one 
part of a total compensation package. This deferred 
compensation theory also has proven to be an inadequate 
explanation of pension payments in practice and has been 
replaced or supplemented by other theories discussed 
later in this chapter.
One possible alternative interpretation of pension 
payments that makes use of the deferred compensation 
theory is that employers do not pay pension benefits as 
a result of a gratuitous intent or because of an 
existing obligation. Instead, pension payments are paid 
by employers because of the current and future benefits 
employers, not employees, expect to receive. That is, 
pension payments can be viewed as creating goodwill that 
employers hope will result in greater current and future 
productivity. Employers expect current and future 
employees to provide services partly because they expect 
to receive pension benefits, and an employer's history 
with respect to pension benefits reasonably could be 
expected to affect employees' subjective assessments of 
the probability of receiving pension benefits.
If any obligation to make future payments exists, 
whether the obligation is legal, mo r a l , or just a
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commitment on the employer's part because of anticipated 
goodwill, the deferred part of a compensation package 
can be viewed as having some current value. As in the 
case of current wages, deferred wages may be subject to 
negotiation. Negotiation, or even a desire to 
negotiate, does not appear to exist in all cases at an 
individual employee level [See, Johnson and Higgins, 
1979], but there is some evidence that tradeoffs occur 
on an aggregate level [e.g., Pesando and Rea, 1977 and 
Bernstein, 1964].
The deferred wage theory of pension payments is 
widely held today 1 3  although, as stone [1982] observed, 
the deferred wage theory does not appear to provide a 
satisfactory explanation for at least three empirically 
observable situations:
1 . deferred vesting provisions are present in 
many plans;
2 . many firms integrate pension benefits with 
social security benefits; and
3. some United States and Canadian firms make 
unilateral upward adjustments in the pensions 
of retired employees.
The apparent discrepancies in theory and practice can be
reconciled with the aid of concepts borrowed from option
pricing theory and agency theory as discussed below.
13For examples of how this view has been used to set 
policy see U . S . Congress (1973) and FASB (1981).
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PENSIONS AS CONTINGENT CLAIMS
The use of deferred vesting provisions increases 
uncertainty for employers and employees because of the 
method used to compensate employees, but the use of an 
alternative compensation method does not change the 
underlying substance of the transaction: employees
receive something of value in return for their services. 
The uncertainty may change the present value of the 
potential future benefits, but uncertainty does not 
cause the potential future benefits, as indicated by the 
first objection in the preceding section, to become 
worthless. Also, vesting deferral may be part of an 
employee incentive package offered by employers.
However, no inherent conflict exists between deferred 
vesting and employee compensation.
The second objection raised above to the deferred 
wage theory as an explanation of empirical observations 
can be resolved in a similar manner. Social security 
benefits are themselves uncertain, and private pension 
plans may be used to reduce the risk that an employee 
will face retirement with an inadequate amount of 
income. While integration with social security benefits 
may reduce the value of future pension payments, 
integration does not necessarily mean that the 
conditional payments have no value.
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The third objection to the deferred wage theory is 
more difficult to reconcile with a theory that explains 
pension payments. Perhaps unilateral adjustment of 
pensions for retired employees is explained best as an 
effort by employers to create goodwill and confidence 
among current and future employees. That is, a 
reduction in the uncertainty of pension adequacy may 
increase the value of deferred pension benefits. This 
explanation seems more plausible than the "implicit 
contract" theory suggested by Pesando and Rea [1977].
Some commentators have attempted a rigorous 
explanation of the pension-related behavior discussed 
above through the use of option pricing theory and 
agency theory. Treynor, Regan, and Priest [197 6 ] and 
Logue [1979], for example, argued that pension benefits 
represent contingent claims. That is, employees receive 
wages in the form of current payments and future 
payments that are conditioned upon the occurrence of 
stipulated events. Using an option pricing approach, 
employees place a value on the conditional future 
payments, i.e., the option, taking into account 
individual utility functions and probability estimates. 
Then, choices are made by employees in an attempt to 
optimize total compensation.
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PENSIONS AND AGENCY THEORY
Agency theory has been used to examine the costs of 
monitoring and enforcing relations among groups acting 
as principals and agents [e.g., Watts, 1977]. A 
primary feature of agency theory is that agents, not 
principals, ultimately bear monitoring and supervision 
costs. Logue [1979] used agency theory to explain why 
employers, employees, and investors would choose 
uncertain future payments in exchange for certain 
current payments. The reasons for such a choice are 
tied to the savings that may result from long-term 
employment. Delayed retirement payments provide 
employees with an incentive to remain with the same 
employer for an extended period of time. The employee 
incentive arises from an employee's ability to share in 
employer savings brought about by reduced training and 
hiring costs. As evidence of this shared savings, Logue 
cited the relatively small number of retirement plans 
among certain industries with low hiring and training 
costs.
SELECTED STUDIES
Many studies provide support for the theories 
described above. Perhaps the most widely supported 
theory is the deferred wage theory [Pesando and Clarke, 
1983, p. 733], The notion of benefit tradeoffs has been
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extensively tested, and as indicated at the beginning of 
this chapter, a basic premise of this study is that 
employer contributions to employee retirement 
arrangements are costs incurred by employers. This 
section briefly describes the results and conclusions of 
selected studies which tend to support one or more of 
the theories discussed above.
Ehrenberg [1980] attempted to determine if public 
sector employees trade retirement benefits for wages. 
Cross-section regression analysis was used to estimate 
the effect of a variety of pension plan characteristics 
on employee wages. Among the plan characteristics 
included in the regression model were the existence of a 
compulsory retirement a g e , a minimum age requirement for 
retirement benefit eligibility, the salary percentage 
employees received for minimum regular retirement 
benefits, and employee contributions as a fraction of 
annual salary.
Perhaps the most interesting result of the 
Ehrenberg study was that the amount of plan funding is 
related to wage level differentials. This indicates 
that employee and employer perceptions about the 
likelihood of retirement benefit payments are affected 
by plan funding. Other plan characteristics affected 
wage levels in predictable directions. That is, 
generous plan characteristics tended to be associated
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with lower wage levels, indicating that pension 
benefits, indeed, are traded for current wages.
Woodbury [1983] used a transcendental logarithmic 
indirect utility function to estimate preferences for 
wage and nonwage benefits. This method of estimation 
uses a general indirect utility function for the price 
of wages, the price of fringe benefits, income, and 
workplace variables to obtain estimates of employee 
preferences for wage and nonwage compensation.
Estimates of the rate of substitution between wages 
and fringe benefits indicated that fringe benefits were 
consistently substituted for wages at a rate exceeding 
unity. The inclusion of pension benefits in the 
definition of fringe benefits caused the rate of 
substitution to increase. Woodbury found that, in 
general, employee sensitivity to retirement benefit 
changes is greater than employee sensitivity to other 
fringe benefits. Also of interest were the discoveries 
that larger organizations tend to pay proportionately 
larger shares of fringe benefits and that collective 
bargaining causes the compensation mix to shift towards 
fringe benefits and away from current wages.
White [1983] also found evidence of employee 
substitution of nonwage compensation for current wages. 
White examined employee preferences for educational, 
retirement, legal, life insurance, and health insurance
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benefits. The experimental task was for subjects to 
allocate their total salaries among current cash wages 
and the five noncash benefits. Half of the subjects 
were told that the noncash benefits were taxable; the 
other subjects were told that noncash benefits were not 
taxable.
The results of White's study suggest that employees 
prefer to be paid, at least in part, in the form of 
noncash benefits. Employee preferences for the noncash 
benefits varied widely, however. Tax treatment affected 
the choice of education, retirement, and legal benefits. 
Job classification affected the choice of all noncash 
benefits except life insurance.
Halperin and Tzur [1985] used an approach 
significantly different from the approaches used in the 
studies discussed above. In an attempt to explain which 
factors cause employers to substitute the payment of 
nontaxable benefits for currently taxable wages,
Halperin and Tzur asked employers to choose a 
compensation package, made up of wages and nontaxable 
benefits, which would minimize employer expenses but 
provide a constant level of employee utility.
Not surprisingly, the results of this study 
indicated that tax favored benefits are substituted more 
freely for wages in the form of cash as employee income 
rises. Using the Halperin and Tzur model, health
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insurance benefits were substituted even if employee 
income was relatively low. In addition, Halperin and 
Tzur found that employees at a compensation level near 
the minimum wage could benefit by receiving less 
compensation in the form of cash. A wide range of 
middle management employees were found to be at the 
maximum level of fringe benefits under the applicable 
laws.
SUMMARY
Various theories have been offered to explain the 
existence of retirement arrangements and the forms these 
plans have taken in practice. Neither gratuity theory 
nor deferred wage theory alone appears sufficient to 
explain current plan practices, but when combined with 
option pricing theory and agency theory, deferred wage 
theory has provided a framework for generating 
hypotheses and empirically testing the effects of 
retirement arrangements. This chapter concludes with a 
figure originally presented by stone [1982, p. 2] which 
shows the path taken by retirement plan theorists on 
their journey to a more complete understanding of 
retirement arrangements.
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FIGURE 2-11 4  
THE LINKAGE OF PENSION THEORY DEVELOPMENT, 
ACCOUNTING, REFORM LEGISLATION,
AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
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14Originally presented by Stone (1982).
CHAPTER 3
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RETIREMENT PLANS AND 
INTERJURISDICTIONAL TAX DIFFERENTIALS
Following World War II, governmental control over 
wages caused employees and employers to focus on fringe 
benefits as a method of compensation . 1 5  Employer 
payments to retirement plans were used to reduce taxes 
and provided a benefit to employees. Later, employer 
contributions were allowed as deductions only if the 
plan did not discriminate in favor of certain groups. 
This requirement put pressure on employers to include a 
broader range and a larger number of employees in 
company retirement plans. Such plans were well received 
by employees since employer contributions to qualified 
plans were not taxable to employees at the time 
employers contributed to the retirement arrangement, and
15For a general discussion of the history of fringe 
benefits as a component of compensation see McGill 
[1984] and Summerfeld et al. [1984].
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instead, amounts paid to employees were taxed as the 
benefits were received.
Retirement plan abuses accompanied the rise in 
pension plan popularity. Inadequately funded plans and 
harsh vesting schedules caused the benefits of many 
retirement plans to be illusory. In addition, job 
mobility was often affected by plan requirements. The 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 was 
enacted to prevent many of these abuses, and subsequent 
tax laws giving preferential treatment to certain 
retirement arrangements have made retirement plans a 
major consideration for both employees and employers 
[Cymrot, 1981].
The increase in retirement plan popularity has not 
gone unnoticed by critics of the trend. Some have 
suggested that tax deferral may be inequitable. In 
addition to deferring taxation, certain provisions allow 
favorable tax treatment when benefits are eventually 
received. Also, benefits may be taxed during an 
employee's retirement years when other income and 
marginal tax rates are low. Taxpayers who receive 
compensation in the form of taxable wages during their 
productive years do not receive a comparable benefit.
In fact, employees covered by some form of retirement 
plan may be better able to pay a tax on compensation 
than those who are not participants in such p l a n s . Some
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commentators [e.g., Berle, 1959] have expressed concern 
about the potential for concentrations of wealth, and 
corresponding amounts of power, among the relatively 
small group of individuals responsible for the 
investment of retirement plan funds. The introduction 
of individual retirement accounts has substantially 
reduced the amount of criticism concerning distortions 
in individual taxpayer equity, but many of the arguments 
used against qualified retirement arrangements apply to 
individual retirement accounts as well.
Federal and state tax policies almost certainly 
have contributed to the current emphasis on retirement 
arrangements by both employers and employees [See, 
Lewellen, 1975; Galper and Zimmerman, 1977; Feldstein, 
1976; Fredland et al., 1968; Romans and Ganti, 1979; 
Eaton and Rosen, 198 0; Keeley, 1980; Hemming, 1980; and
Brannigan, 1985]. Little is known, however, about the 
effect of tax policies on small employer retirement plan 
costs and the related effects on state and local 
economies.
For example, a recent survey [U.S. League Survey, 
1984] found that individual retirement account and 
simplified employee plan assets tend to be invested in 
in-state banks and thrift institutions, but the 
implications of such a tendency are far from clear.
These institutions usually supply credit to in-state
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creditors giving apparent support to local economies 
[Murrman et a l ., 1984]. Qualified plans, on the other 
hand, reasonably could be expected to have a more 
geographically diverse portfolio of investments.
While this means that states might want to 
encourage employers to establish simplified employee 
plans instead of qualified retirement plans, many have 
argued for indirect investment by qualified retirement 
plans, instead, as a way of making a social investment 
as well as an economic investment in state and local 
economies [e.g., Murrman et al., 1984], For example, 
socially desirable goals could be promoted by requiring 
that a state pension plan invest in low income 
housing . 1 6  In this manner, investments might benefit 
plan participants both directly and indirectly.
The ultimate effect of such investments is 
sometimes unclear. For example, apparent increases in 
investment in state economies may merely displace other 
investments. Increases in investment may occur only 
when such investments reach parts of a state or local 
economy that would not otherwise have been funded 
because of an inefficient market for funds or because of 
some bias in the economy.
16New York City public employee pension funds were 
used in this way when New York City was in financial 
trouble a few years ago.
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Research to date on the effects of state and local 
taxation has focused on explanations for 
interjurisdictional differences in economic variables 
instead of explanations for the aggregate levels of 
economic variables. This emphasis on differences 
caused by interjurisdictional tax variability may be 
due, in part, to the relative difficulty of explaining 
the aggregate prices of capital, labor, and other 
economic variables. Wheaton [1986] observed that the 
ultimate effect of state taxation or taxation within any 
identifiable jurisdiction is related to several factors:
1 . price elasticities of state output demand,
2 . local supply elasticities, and
3. technology or substitution between factors.
Wheaton suggested a trichotomous division of the 
empirical research which has been done on the impact of 
interjurisdictional differences in business taxes. He 
stopped short of a detailed description of the 
literature in each of the three categories above, 
perhaps because so little can be inferred from these 
studies. Indeed, Due's [1961] early observations still
appear to summarize what is known about
interjurisdictional tax differentials.
First, even relatively high state and local tax 
levels, acting alone, do not appear to have the drastic 
effects on firm behavior that might be predicted on the
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basis of casual observation of taxation differences 
among jurisdictions. Second, tax considerations may 
have an effect on firm location decisions if most or all 
of the other relevant factors are equal. For example, 
lower property taxes might cause a firm to locate in a 
particular state if the alternative is a neighboring 
state with similar levels of other taxes. Finally, 
certain areas might be excluded from consideration by a 
firm because of a general perception that the area does 
not have a healthy business environment. This means 
that in some cases all available alternatives may not be 
evaluated because of the initial screening process for 
suitable business locations.
Due also offered an explanation for the 
inconclusive results that characterize most of the 
interjurisdictional research. Adapting Gresham's Law to 
the firm location decision, Due speculated that firms 
tend to locate in areas with relatively low taxes, but 
the evaluation of tax levels is clouded by assessments 
of the efficiency with which jurisdictions provide 
public services. That is, the economy of locating in a 
geographic area must be evaluated in light of the amount 
and quality of the public services provided in return 
for the tax dollars paid. In this way, state and local 
taxes may cause nonoptimal location decisions because of 
illusory savings.
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All of the comments above can be summarized by 
saying that no comprehensive theoretical framework 
exists for the effects of interjurisdictional business 
tax differences. The following sections of this paper 
summarize selected interjurisdictional tax differential 
studies using the trichotomy Wheaton suggested. Taken 
as a whole, these studies do not support any single 
theory of interjurisdictional tax differentials. That 
is, they do not appear to support a theory that explains 
the effects of such differentials. Perhaps continued 
study of the issues related to interjurisdictional tax 
differentials will result in such a theory.
CROSS-SECTION STUDIES
The earliest researchers to examine business tax 
impacts used a cross-section approach to investigate the 
effects of differences in tax levels. At best, the 
results of these studies were mixed.
Several early studies examined growth rates in 
states with differing tax burdens. Bloom [1955] 
examined manufacturing employment growth and capital 
outlays of manufacturers to determine the degree of 
correlation between these variables and per capita 
state-local tax collections and the growth in these tax 
collections during the periods 1939 to 1953 and 1947 to 
1953. No significant correlations were found. A small
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positive correlation was found between the growth in tax 
collections and the growth in manufacturing employment, 
however the limitations of this study obscure the 
meaning of these results.
For example, the taxes examined were not limited to 
those placed on manufacturers. In addition, there was 
no attempt to identify other factors that might have 
influenced manufacturing growth during the period under 
study. Therefore, the apparent conclusion to be drawn 
from this study, that i s , that high taxes are associated 
with high rates of growth in manufacturing employment, 
must be discounted considerably.
Another study by Thompson and Mattila [1959] 
attempted to correct some of the shortcomings of the 
Bloom study by looking at taxes on a per employee basis 
and by using a more sophisticated econometric approach. 
However, after examining twenty-nine manufacturing 
industries from 1947 to 1954 no significant 
correlations were found between employment growth and 
tax differences between states.
Due [1961] has attacked the results of the above 
studies and the results of other studies which have used 
similar approaches. He pointed out three major problems 
with studies of this ilk:
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1. failure to distinguish among firms which have
significant discretion as to geographic 
location,
2. failure to distinguish between types of
taxation, and
3. failure to show that the results in rapidly
growing states would have been similar if
lower taxes had been imposed.
Due argued that, at best, these early studies fail to
show a relationship between taxation and economic
growth. They hardly prove the absence of a
relationship.
Some early researchers used surveys to approach the 
problem in a different manner. These early surveys 
attempted to identify general factors or specific taxes 
that affect location decisions.17 An assessment of the 
degree to which tax factors affect location decisions 
has not been attempted, but some studies have offered 
limited insight into this question by determining the 
ratio of taxes to other amounts, such as specific costs, 
within a given firm.18 Even these studies, however, may 
have missed the mark because they failed to identify 
which comparisons are most important in the firm
17For example, Strasma (1959, p . 14) found that 16 
percent of 196 manufacturing firm respondents indicated 
that local taxes influenced past location decisions and 
19 percent indicated that state taxes had influenced 
location decisions.
18E . g . , Yntema, 1959 (comparisons of the relative 
tax costs of firms in Michigan with those of neighboring 
states).
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location decision. For example, the overall importance 
of tax factors may be determined by comparing taxes in 
various jurisdictions with some variable such as firm 
p rofit.
Typical of some of the earlier surveys, Wheaton 
[1983], in a fairly recent survey, tried to determine 
the magnitude of tax differentials by comparing the 
total tax burden, that is all taxes for which businesses 
are liable, for each of the 48 continental states. He 
found that state and local taxes amount to, on the 
average, eight percent of business income and that 
there is wide variation across states. No specific 
conclusions were reached in this study, but Wheaton 
suggested that the variation between states, i.e., 
between four percent and twelve percent, has 
significantly affected business resource allocation and 
that the challenge to tax researchers is to describe the 
nature of these effects.
The research described above focused on the impact 
of interstate tax differentials. In a review of the 
cross-section literature on interjurisdictional tax 
differentials Oakland [1978] described the issues 
related to interjurisdictional tax differentials in 
terms of their effects on several major social 
problems. Oakland argued that resolution of these 
social problems requires a different approach.
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Instead of the interstate approach, Oakland 
emphasized the intraurban effects of tax differentials. 
Oakland agreed with Due that little has been learned 
about industrial location decisions since the early 
cross-section studies, and he cited three reasons for 
the lack of understanding:
1. we do not yet fully understand the processes 
that influence intrametropolitan location;
2. there is a general lack of necessary data; and
3. few researchers have attempted to study the 
issue [Oakland, 1978 p. 13.].
Indeed, Oakland was able to identify only three serious
attempts to address the problem of intraurban industrial
location. Oakland cited as evidence of the importance
of interjurisdictional tax study the effect that such
differences have on the urban poor. That is, as large
urban areas become increasingly suburbanized, the urban
poor are left stranded because of the fiscal
deterioration of many cities.
Lamenting the lack of evidence in prior studies,
Oakland stressed the importance of intraurban tax
research, to the exclusion of research on any
intermetrapolitan effects of tax differentials, saying
The significance of [prior] findings . . . is
that the supply of industrial firms to a 
particular metropolitan area can be assumed 
independent of the fiscal environment in the 
area and thus the problem reduces to one of 
determining whether fiscal factors influence 
the spacial distribution of the stock of firms 
within the urban area [Oakland, 1978, p. 15].
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The three studies which Oakland identified as 
meritorious used multiple regression to explain the 
effects of tax rate differentials upon industry 
locations within a single metropolitan area. These 
studies appear to have received Oakland's approbation 
primarily because of their intraurban approach to the 
problem. Judged on the basis of their information 
content these studies were as disappointing as the 
interstate studies mentioned earlier.
Beaton and Joun [1968] examined the effects of 
various independent variables on the percentage increase 
in manufacturing employment from 1958 to 1965. The 
study used 20 cities in Orange County, California. The 
results of this study indicated that the model may not 
have been properly specified. For example, high 
property tax rates were found to actually encourage 
industry location.
Fox [197 3] studied the Cleveland and Cincinnati 
areas using a cross-section methodology in which the 
dependent variable was the per capita increase in the 
industrial property tax base from 1964 to 1969. In the 
Cleveland area, the tax rate coefficient was found to be 
negative and statistically significant. The elasticity 
of investment to the tax rate was found to be 4.4, 
indicating that industrial investments were sensitive to 
changes in tax rates. The reasonableness of most of the
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coefficient signs in this study inspire more confidence 
than the earlier Beaton and Joun study.
The Fox model did not work as well for the 
Cincinnati area, however. As in the Beaton and Joun 
study, tax rates in the Cincinnati area were found to be 
positively related to industrial investment. Again, the 
model appears to have been inappropriately specified.
Schmenner [1974] examined the effects of property 
tax differentials as well as local income tax 
differentials using as dependent variables the 
percentage of standard metropolitan statistical area 
manufacturing employment from 1967 to 1969 and from 19 69 
to 1971 and the percentage increase in standard 
metropolitan statistical area manufacturing employment 
from 1967 to 1969 and from 1969 to 1971. Four 
metropolitan areas were used. For the most part, 
coefficients were not found to be significant, and 
again, unanticipated signs were attached to the 
coefficients. There was some weak evidence from the 
Schmenner study that while property tax differentials 
are unimportant, income tax differentials are important.
In summary, the studies conducted by Beaton and 
Joun, Fox, and Schmenner may have been commendable, as 
suggested by Oakland, for their intraurban approach, but 
they did not produce much additional evidence as to the 
importance of tax differentials.
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TIME SERIES STUDIES
Another group of studies used a time series 
approach to investigate the effects of tax 
differentials. This group of studies differs from the 
cross-section studies discussed earlier in a number of 
ways. The time series studies generally have found 
significant differences, a result which was conspicuous 
by its absence in most of the cross-section studies.
Grieson et al. [1977] examined a tax change in New 
York city that occurred in 1966. Data from the period 
1962 to 1965 and 1966 to 1971 was used to determine if 
the tax change significantly affected employment in 
industries relative to employment in the United States 
as a whole. The tax change resulted from a switch from 
a tax which approximated a gross receipts tax to a tax 
resembling a gross profits tax. In this way, tax rates 
for some industries were altered as a result of the 
change in tax structure.
With respect to manufacturing firms in New York 
City, a significant location elasticity factor of -.35 
was found indicating that manufacturing industries were 
in fact affected by changes in local taxation. No 
significant elasticity factors were found for 
nonmanufacturing industries. The authors speculated 
that the differences in manufacturing and
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nonmanufacturing industries resulted because 
manufacturing industries generally are unable to pass 
along cost differences brought about by local taxes. 
Nonmanufacturing industries may be more likely to 
exploit the unique characteristics of the local 
environment and may be better equipped to pass along 
differences in cost caused by local taxes. The authors 
believed that this could be true especially in the their 
study examining differences in New York City.
Grieson [1980] studied the effects of changes in 
the rate of the Philadelphia income tax on employment 
and aggregate city tax revenues using data from the 
years 1965 to 1975. The model worked very well, and 
most of the tax coefficients were significant.
Grieson's study lends considerable credibility to the 
argument that state and local tax differentials affect 
factors of production.
POOLED CROSS-SECTION AND TIME SERIES STUDIES
Any enthusiasm resulting from the promising results 
of the time series studies above should be tempered by 
the results of later studies which pooled cross-section 
and time series data. This later group of studies found 
little evidence that geographic tax differentials 
significantly affected the values of economic 
variables.
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For example, Steinnes [1977] examined towns within 
a single metropolitan area by pooling cross-section and 
time series data and found little evidence that local 
tax differences affected the growth of business 
establishments. Carlton [1979] obtained similar 
results when he examined the growth of new firms in 
specific industries across different metropolitan 
areas.
SUMMARY
The above review of the research that has been done 
on interjurisdictional tax differentials suggests that 
very little has been learned since Due's observations in 
1961. Researchers appear to be unable to completely and 
consistently specify the relationships, or even to 
accurately predict, the effects of interjurisdictional 
tax differentials on important economic variables.
CHAPTER 4
RETIREMENT PLAN TAXATION
The amount of tax paid by an individual as a result 
of a distribution from a retirement arrangement may vary 
widely depending upon the facts and circumstances which 
surround the distribution. The amount and timing of tax 
liabilities may be affected by such factors as the 
amount of other taxable income or whether distributions 
are received in the form of cash or property. In this 
study, two factors are considered which affect the tax 
liabilities associated with retirement plan 
distributions: 1) the type of plan from which
distributions are made and 2) the state tax policy under 
which distributions are taxed. This study took as its 
population of interest those plan benefits which are 
paid in a lump sum transfer of cash to plan 
participants. This population may appear restrictive at 
first blush, but because of the favorable tax benefits
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available to taxpayers who elect to receive plan 
benefits in this manner, there exists a strong incentive 
to receive plan distributions in a lump sum. other 
factors which affect an employer's cost of providing 
after-tax retirement benefits, such as plan 
administration cost, will be discussed in Chapter 5.
QUALIFIED PLANS
Qualified plans are those retirement arrangements 
which meet certain statutory requirements. For their 
trouble, such plans receive favorable tax treatment.
One of the most significant features, from an employee's 
point of view, is that employees are not required to 
include in taxable income employer contributions to 
qualified retirement plans [§§402(a) and 403(a)].19 
That is, although employees receive a benefit from 
employer contributions to retirement arrangements, 
employees are not taxed in the year during which such 
contributions are made. In addition, earnings on 
contributions are not taxable to employees while the 
earnings remain in the plan [§§401(a) and 501(a)]. 
Employees are taxed when plan benefits are actually
19Unless otherwise indicated, section references are 
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or the regulations 
thereunder. Citations to Pre-TRA 1986 sections refer to 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, and the 
regulations thereunder. References to Act sections 
refer to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 unless otherwise 
indicated.
55
received by employees. Even then, substantial tax 
reduction may result from tax computation alternatives 
which are available under federal and state tax laws.
The requirements for qualification are set forth in 
§§401 et seq. The requirements are meant to deny 
preferential tax treatment for plans which are not for 
the exclusive benefit of plan participants and to 
preclude the plan abuses mentioned earlier in Chapter 2. 
In general, plan qualification means that certain 
minimum standards must be met with respect to plan 
discrimination, funding, participation, and vesting. 
Because this study is not directly concerned with these 
requirements, and because of the complexity of many of 
the requirements, a detailed discussion of all 
requirements for plan qualification will not be 
presented here. The reader should refer to §§ 401 et 
seq. for specific qualification requirements. The 
discussion which follows is general and addresses only 
those requirements which bear most directly on the 
taxation of distributions from qualified plans at an 
individual taxpayer level.
Taxation Of Qualified Plan Distributions
Assuming no employee contributions to a qualified 
plan, employees are required to include all plan 
distributions in gross income in the year distributions 
are received [§§402(a) and 403(a)]. If no tax relief
provisions apply, the progressive nature of the United 
States federal income tax causes the federal income tax 
in the year of distribution to be substantial for many 
taxpayers. That is, taxpayers who elect to receive 
retirement benefits in a lump sum could incur a 
substantially higher tax than taxpayers who elect to 
receive benefits over a period of time greater than one 
year.
Pre-TRA 1986 Rules. Under prior law, that is, 
prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986), two 
provisions offered a great deal of relief to taxpayers 
who received plan distributions. The first provision 
allowed any portion of a qualified plan distribution 
attributable to employee participation prior to 1974 to 
be treated as long-term capital gain [Pre-TRA 1986 
§402 (a) (2)]. The second provision allowed any portion 
of a qualified plan distribution attributable to post 
1973 plan participation to be taxed under a special ten 
year forward averaging computation if the distribution 
was received as a lump sum. In many cases taxpayers 
were able to pay less tax by electing, as allowed under 
Pre-TRA 1986 §402(e)(4)(L), to have the entire 
distribution, that is even the portion eligible for 
capital gain treatment, taxed as ordinary income under 
the ten year forward averaging rules.
57
The tax on a lump sum distribution was computed 
under the ten year forward averaging method in the 
following manner:
1. The lump sum distribution, including any 
capital gain portion was reduced by a the 
minimum distribution allowance. The minimum 
distribution allowance was defined [Pre-TRA 
1986 §402(e)(1)(D)] as
a. the lesser of $10,000 or half of the lump 
sum distribution, reduced by
b. 2 0 percent of the amount by which the 
lump sum distribution exceeded $20,000.
2. The resulting amount was then divided by 10.
3. After adding the current y e a r ’s zero bracket 
amount for single taxpayers to the amount 
computed in 2 above, a tax was computed using 
the rate schedule for single taxpayers even if 
the taxpayer used another filing status to 
determine the federal income tax on other 
income.
4. The tax computed in 3 above was multiplied by 
10.
5. The tax on the ordinary income portion of the 
distribution was then computed by taking a 
portion of the tax computed in 4 above equal 
to the ratio of the ordinary income component 
of the distribution to the total distribution.
Example 4-1 shows how the averaging provisions 
described above can affect a taxpayer's total tax 
liability. Notice that under the facts shown, the 
amount of tax which would be due on a $90,000 lump sum 
distribution without any averaging relief is $21,354 
greater than the tax due under the ten year forward 
averaging rules.
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The Effect Of TRA 1986. TRA 1986 altered the rules 
for plan distributions considerably. The capital gain 
treatment that was previously available for 
distributions attributable to pre-1974 plan 
participation was phased out except in the case of 
distributions to individuals who were 50 years old on or 
before January 1, 1986. Capital gain treatment will be
completely eliminated for distributions after 1991 [Act 
§1122].
Perhaps of even greater significance was the change 
caused by TRA 1986 to the ten year forward averaging 
rules. A procedure similar to the ten year forward 
averaging method is available after January 1, 1986, but 
the averaging period is five years instead of ten years 
[Act §1122 ] .
Example 4-2 shows how the new five year forward 
averaging procedure works. Under the same facts as in 
Example 4-1, a taxpayer would save only $18,204 by 
electing the five year forward averaging method assuming 
the five year forward averaging method applied to 
distributions received in 1986. Note that the tax which 
resulted from the five year forward averaging method is 
$3,150 more than the tax computed under the ten year 
forward averaging method.
A transition rule allows taxpayers who were 50 
years old before January 1, 1986 to elect the ten year
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forward averaging method or the five year forward 
averaging method, but if the ten year forward averaging 
method is used the tax rates in effect during 1986 must 
be used. Example 4-3 shows that if the lump sum 
distribution in Example 4-1 were received in 1987, the 
total tax would be $33,060 without any averaging relief 
and $9,570 under a five year forward averaging election. 
Because the taxpayer in Example 4-3 is 63 years old, the 
transition rules apply and the appropriate comparison 
for tax planning purposes is between the tax liability 
computed in Example 4-1, using ten year forward 
averaging and 198 6 rates, and Example 4-3, using five 
year forward averaging and 1987 rates. Clearly, the 
better choice would be to elect five year forward 
averaging.
Qualification As A Lump Sum nistribution. To be 
eligible for the special averaging treatment, under 
either the ten year forward averaging provisions or the 
new five year forward averaging rules, taxpayers must 
receive within one taxable year the entire interest in a 
qualified retirement plan. In addition, the payment 
must be made after the taxpayer has reached age 59 1/2 
or as a result of the taxpayer's permanent disability, 
death, or separation from service [§402 (e) (4) (A) ]. Both 
the capital gain and averaging rules are available only 
once [§ 402 (e) (4) (B ) ].
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SIMPLIFIED EMPLOYEE PLANS
As previously mentioned, simplified employee plans 
were created in 1978 to give employers a method of 
providing retirement benefits to employees without 
having to meet the complex requirements associated with 
qualified plans. Simplified employee plans are 
established by employers but are funded by employer 
contributions to employee individual retirement 
accounts. If the requirements of §408(k) are met, the 
annual amount which can be deducted by employers is 
approximately the same as for a qualified defined 
contribution plan (i.e., 15 percent of compensation up 
to $30,000 [5219(b)(2)]. Prior to TRA 1986, 
contributions were required for each employee who had 
attained age 25 and who had performed service for the 
employer in three or more years during the preceding 
five calendar years [Pre-TRA 1986 §408(k)(2)]. TRA 1986 
changed many of the restrictions placed on simplified 
employee plans, generally bringing simplified employee 
plans more in line with the tax treatment for qualified 
plans and with salary reduction arrangements previously 
available under §401(k).
Under prior law, employer contributions to a 
simplified employee plan were deductible by employers, 
within limits, but employees were required to include
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such employer contributions in gross income. Employees 
were then allowed a corresponding deduction. Act 
§ 1 1 0 8 (b) and (c) , amending Pre-TRA 1986 §§402(h)(1) and 
404(h)(1), left employers the right to claim a 
deduction of simplified employee plan contributions, but 
employees may now exclude some or all of such 
contributions from gross income until plan assets are 
distributed.
The deduction limitations on employers remain 15 
percent of compensation, including any salary reduction 
contributions allowed under §401(k)(6), up to $30,000 
(§402(h) (2)20]. However, a $7,000 annual limitation 
applies to amounts excludable from employee gross income 
[§402(g)(1)]. The $7,000 limitation applies to both 
§401(k) plans and §408(k) plans, but note that the limit 
is not a limitation on simplified employee plan 
contributions or the amount which can be deducted by 
employers. Instead, employer contributions in excess of 
$7,000 must be included in gross income. Participants 
in §401(k) plans are taxed on any excess and 
participants in §408(k) plans will be allowed a 
corresponding deduction for any additional 
contributions.
20Note that §402(g) and (h) were incorrectly 
numbered by TRA 1986. The correct citations are §40 1 (i) 
and (j), respectively.
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Participation Requirements
Act § 1898(a) (5), amending Pre-TRA 1986 
§408(k)(2)(A), requires that employers make simplified 
employee plan contributions for each employee who has 
attained age 21, has performed services for the employer 
during three or more of the preceding five years, and 
has $300 or more in compensation from the employer 
during the year. Act §1108(d), adding §408(k)(2), 
allows the exclusion of certain employees for purposes 
of the above requirement as allowed for qualified plans 
under §410(b)(3)(A) and (C).
Simplified Employee Plans Compared To Qualified Plans
The primary advantage of simplified employee plans, 
when compared to qualified plans, is that substantial 
savings may result from the lower administration costs 
associated with simplified employee plans. Employer 
contributions to a simplified employee plan, and any 
earnings on employer contributions, escape, for a time, 
the federal income tax as in the case of qualified 
plans. The problem, indeed, one of the main points of 
this study, is that distributions from simplified 
employee plans are not eligible for the federal 
averaging computations or capital gain treatment. That 
is, a lump sum distribution from a simplified employee 
plan is treated as ordinary income for federal tax 
purposes. Consider, for example, the effect of plan
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type on the taxpayers in Examples 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3. If 
the distributions in those examples were assumed to 
come from simplified employee plans, the tax would be 
the amount computed without any averaging relief.
STATE TAXATION
Most retirement arrangement distributions, whether 
from qualified plans or from simplified employee plans, 
are subject to taxation at a state level as well as at 
the federal level. This study examines employer costs 
under three types of state tax policies:
1. states which do not tax plan distributions 
from either qualified plans or simplified 
employee plans,
2. states which tax plan distributions from both 
qualified plans and simplified employee plans 
at ordinary income tax rates, and
3. states which have some other policy for taxing 
qualified plan and simplified employee plan 
distributions.
Certainly, this trichotomy is not the only possible 
state tax policy classification scheme.21 Table 4-1 
summarizes the state tax laws for qualified plan and 
simplified employee plan distributions in each of the
21For example, Curatola (1986) divided states into 
six categories on the basis of plan contribution 
deductibility by employees, in the case of individual 
retirement accounts, and plan distribution taxation. 
However, Curatola*s classification scheme was based on a 
broader analysis of qualified plans, individual 
retirement accounts, and simplified employee plans.
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fifty states and the District of Columbia.22 Based on 
the information in Table 4-1, Table 4-2 was constructed 
according to the trichotomy mentioned above. The 
absence from Table 4-1 of some state tax law exceptions 
to the general rules which are presented in Table 4-1 
means that a state tax computed under the guidelines of 
Table 4-1 will be only an approximation of the actual 
tax in some states.
SUMMARY
Qualified retirement plans and simplified employee 
plans receive similar tax treatment until plan assets 
are distributed. Upon distribution, qualified plans 
appear to have a clear advantage over simplified 
employee plans because of the federal, and in some cases 
the state, tax relief available to qualified plan 
participants. Whether the tax advantages available to 
qualified plan participants is outweighed by increased 
plan administration costs and by other variables which 
affect plan cost is the subject of later chapters in 
this study.
22This data was originally presented by Curatola 
(1986). The author of the present study was a graduate 
assistant and received financial support from the 
International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans 
during the compilation of this data.
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Example 4-1: John is married and filed a joint tax
return for 1986. John is 63 years old and received a 
$90,000 lump sum distribution from a qualified 
retirement plan during 1986. John had $22,000 of other 
taxable income during the year. The tax on $112,000 of 
taxable income, without the benefit of the ten year 
forward averaging computation is $36,803 including 
additional taxes of $34,064 on the $90,000 lump sum 
distribution. John's 1986 tax liability, assuming a ten 
year forward averaging election is $15,449 including a 
tax of $12,710 on the $90,000 lump sum distribution. 
Under these facts, the ten year forward averaging 
election reduced John's total tax liability by $21,354 
as shown below:
Total tax without ten year forward 
averaging ($112,000 of ordinary 
income)
Total tax using ten year forward 
averaging:
Total lump sum distribution
Less minimum distribution 
allowance
Amount subject to ten year 
forward averaging
Averagable amount divided by 
10
Plus zero bracket amount for 
single taxpayers
Base for tax computation
Tax on base using single rates $ 1,271
Tax on base multiplied by 10 $12,710
Tax on other taxable income 2,739
Total tax using ten year 
forward averaging
Savings from ten year forward $21,354
averaging
$15,449
$36,803
$90,000 
0
$90,000 
$ 9,000 
2, 480 
$11,480
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Example 4-2: Assume the same facts as lrt Example 4-1
except that John used five year forward averaging 
instead of ten year forward averaging. Under these 
facts, five year forward averaging would reduce John's 
total tax liability by $18,204 as shown below:
Total tax without five year forward $36,803
averaging ($112,000 of ordinary
income)
Total tax using five year forward 
averaging:
Total lump sum distribution $90,000
Less minimum distribution 0
allowance
Amount subject to five year $90,000 
forward averaging
Averagable amount divided by 5 $18,000
Plus zero bracket amount for 2,480
single taxpayers
Base for tax computation $20,480
Tax on base using single rates $ 3,172
Tax on base multiplied by 5 $15,860
Tax on other taxable income 2,739
Total tax using five year $18,599
forward averaging
Savings from five year forward $18,204
averaging
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Example 4-3: Assume the same facts as in Example 4-1
except that John received the $90,000 lump sum 
distribution in 1987 and elected five year forward 
averaging. Under these facts, five year forward 
averaging would reduce John's total tax liability by 
$23,490 as shown below:
Total tax without five year forward $33,060
averaging ($112,000 of ordinary
income)
Total tax using five year forward 
averaging:
Total lump sum distribution $90,000
Less minimum distribution 0
allowance
Amount subject to five year $90,000
forward averaging
Averagable amount divided by 5 $18,000
Plus zero bracket amount for N/A
single taxpayers
Base for tax computation $18,000
Tax on base using single rates $ 1,278 
Tax on base multiplied by 5 $ 6,390
Tax on other taxable income 3,180
Total tax using five year $ 9,670
forward averaging
Savings from five year forward $23,490
averaging
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TABLE 4-1
SUMMARY OF DISTRIBUTION TAXATION
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of 
Columbia
Florida
BY STATE
simplified 
Employee 
 Plans
All ordinary 
income
No income tax
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
No income tax
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
No income tax
Qualified 
Plans
All ordinary 
income
No income tax
All ordinary 
income
Taxable under 
AR's TYA
Taxable under 
CA's 7YA
All ordinary 
income
No income tax
Taxable under 
DE's TYA
All ordinary 
income
No income tax
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Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Main
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
All ordinary 
income
Not taxable in 
the case of 
retirement
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
A11 ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
Not taxable in 
the case of 
retirement
All ordinary 
income
Not taxable
All ordinary 
income
25% of TYA tax
13% of TYA tax
Taxable under 
KY's TYA
Not taxable
15% of TYA tax
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
Not taxable
Taxable under 
MN's TYA
All ordinary 
income
Not taxable
10% of TYA tax
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Nebraska 20% of federal 
income tax
20% of federal 
income tax
Nevada No income tax No income tax
New Hampshire No income tax No income tax
New Jersey All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
New Mexico All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
New York All ordinary 
income
Taxable under 
N Y ’s TYA
North Carolina All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
North Dakota All ordinary 
income
Taxable under 
ND's TYA
Ohio All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
Oklahoma All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
Oregon All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
Pennsylvania All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
Rhode Island 23.15% of 
federal income 
tax
23.15% of 
federal income 
tax
South Carolina All ordinary 
income
Taxable under 
S C ’s TYA
South Dakota No income tax No income tax
Tennessee No income tax No income tax
Texas No income tax No income tax
Utah All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
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Vermont
Virginia
Washington 
West Virginia
Wisconsin
26.5% of federal 
income tax
All ordinary 
income
No income tax
All ordinary 
income
All ordinary 
income
26.5% of federal 
income tax
All ordinary 
income
No income tax 
Not taxable
All ordinary 
income
Wyoming No income tax No income tax
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TABLE 4-2
STATES CLASSIFIED BY DISTRIBUTION
Level 1 States Level 2 States
TAXATION
Level 3 States
Alaska Alabama Arkansas
Connecticut Arizona California
Florida Colorado Delaware
Hawaii District of Illinois
Nevada Columbia Iowa
New Hampshire Georgia Kansas
south Dakota Idaho Kentucky
Tennessee Indiana Louisiana
Texas Maryland Maine
Washington Massachusetts Michigan
Wyoming Mississippi Minnesota
New Jersey Missouri
New Mexico Montana
North Carolina Nebraska
Ohio New York
Oklahoma North Dakota
Oregon Rhode Island
Pennsylvania South Carolina
Utah Vermont
Virginia
Wisconsin
West Virginia
Note that Level 1 states are those states which do not 
tax lump sum distributions from qualified plans or 
simplified employee plans. Level 2 states are those 
states which tax lump sum distributions from qualified 
plans and simplified employee plans as ordinary income. 
Level 3 states are those states which have a tax policy 
which falls between the extremes of Level 1 and Level 2 
states.
CHAPTER 5
METHOD
This chapter describes the method used to answer 
the research questions presented earlier. Simulation 
was used to answer the research questions, and although 
this chapter is not about simulation per s e . certain 
aspects of the simulation process are emphasized 
throughout the chapter. The list of factors which led 
to the choice of simulation as the method for answering 
the research questions includes those factors common to 
most simulation experiments:
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1 . the cost of gathering data directly on plan 
cost would have been excessive;
2 . the reliability of data collected directly 
would have been highly suspect because of 
problems associated with self-reported data 
and because of the difficulty of combining 
data collected from employers with data 
collected from employees and other sources; 
and
3. an analytical solution to the research 
questions was not possible because the input 
variables lack theoretical bases, and because 
the combination of inputs, even if a 
theoretical basis for input combination 
existed, would be so complex that simulation 
would have been more convenient.
The simulation approach, although the best approach 
in this case, is not without problems. Rivett [1972] 
said, "The history of mankind is a history of model 
building." If this is true, then this study is an 
example of history repeating itself. One problem with 
repetition, in the case of simulation, is that, as 
Kreutzer [1986, p. 10] pointed out, "Modelling and 
simulation in general still [sic] lacks satisfactory 
theoretical and methodological foundations." However, 
simulation offers advantages over the available 
alternatives in many situations, and much has been done 
in recent years to improve the often intuitive nature of 
the modelling process [See, Zeigler, 1976, 1984;
Zeigler et al., 1979; Doyle, 1976; and Kindler, 1979]. 
Simulation was used here in an attempt to make use of 
the advantages of simulation while avoiding the 
problems associated with the available alternatives.
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The chapter begins with a restatement of the 
research questions. A description of the experimental 
design follows. Next, a section on the system, 
including a theoretical validation of the model and a 
description of the system's subsystems, is presented. A 
sample iteration of the simulation procedure follows.
The sources of all frequency distributions used as input 
for the model are given next, followed by a section on 
data analysis. The chapter concludes with the 
assumptions and limitations of the study.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions were addressed by 
this study:
1. Does retirement plan type affect the cost 
small employers incur to provide 
after-tax retirement benefits to 
employees?
2. Does state tax policy with respect to
retirement arrangements affect the cost
small employers incur to provide 
after-tax retirement benefits to 
employees?
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Because the research questions address two factors 
which affect plan cost, the research questions were 
answered by simulating small employer costs in a 
two-factor design with plan type nested in state tax 
policy. Simulated subject responses were obtained by
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randomly assigning relevant attributes to the simulated 
subjects.
Each of the design factors, as well as the 
subsystems that constitute the system, are discussed in 
more detail in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
Figure 5-1 shows how observations were obtained using a 
computer program to simulate plan costs for a sample of 
employers and employees.
As shown in Figure 5-1, the first step in the 
simulation process was to select a plan type and state 
tax policy and, in each iteration of the simulation 
process, to randomly select values for those employer 
and employee attributes that affect an employer's cost 
of providing after-tax plan benefits. The selection of 
attributes was based on empirical frequency 
distributions for each of the individual attributes. In 
each iteration, values of three employer attributes and 
five employee attributes were selected. In each 
simulation iteration, the employer and employee 
attributes provided a description of the subject. The 
description included the relevant attributes of a small 
employer and an employee of that employer. This 
description then was used to calculate the total cost to 
the employer of making retirement plan contributions 
over the employee's plan participation period. Based on 
the accumulated benefit which resulted from the
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employer's contributions, i.e., a lump sum distribution, 
both federal and state income taxes were computed, given 
the plan type and state. The ratio of employer 
contributions to after-tax employee benefits was used as 
an index of the employer's cost of providing after-tax 
retirement plan benefits.
Plan Type Factor
The plan type factor was examined at three levels 
within each state type factor. The inclusion of three 
levels allowed an examination of (1 ) the effect of plan 
type on employer cost and (2 ) the sensitivity of 
employer cost to plan type.
The research question addressed by the plan type 
factor, obviously, was directed at the difference in 
small employer cost for simplif ied employee plans and 
qualified plans. Qualified plans, however, are so 
varied that discovering a representative cost for such 
plans was thought to be impossible. Therefore, two 
qualified plans were used, one a low cost qualified plan 
alternative and one a high cost qualified plan 
alternative. The third level of the plan type factor 
was a simplified employee plan.
The plan administration costs used for this study 
were based on discussions with plan administrators and 
actuaries. This informal approach was required because 
of a general lack of cost data for small retirement
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arrangements. Every effort was made to assure that any 
errors associated with plan cost were understatement 
errors in the case of low-cost qualified plans and 
overstatement errors in the case of high-cost qualified 
plans. Because one of the a Priori expectations of 
this study was that simplified employee plans would be 
more costly on an after-tax basis than the other 
retirement arrangements examined, the costs associated 
with simplified employee plan administration were 
conservatively estimated. That is, any errors made in 
estimating simplified employee plan administration 
costs are likely to have been errors of cost 
understatement.
The use of a three levels of the plan type factor 
permitted the possibility of finding that qualified 
plans are no more costly than simplified employee plans 
only in the case of low-cost qualified plan 
alternatives. For example, defined contribution 
qualified plans are generally believed to be less 
expensive than defined benefit plans because defined 
contribution plans do not require the use of actuaries 
to determine the required employer contributions.
Defined benefit plans reasonably could be expected to 
differ significantly in cost from simplified employee 
plans even if the difference in cost between defined 
contribution plans and simplified employee plans is
79
insignificant. Also, the three-level design allowed 
statistical inferences about the difference in the cost 
of the two types of qualified plans. Tax computations, 
obviously, were affected by the level of the plan type 
variable because of the differing tax treatment accorded 
qualified plans and simplified employee plans.
Low-cost Qualified Plans. Low-cost qualified plans 
were assumed to have no initial fixed cost when plan 
participants enter the system. However, an annual cost 
of $ 1 0  per plan participant was assumed, with a minimum 
charge of $150 per employer. For example, an employer 
with 16 plan participants was treated as having 
incurred an annual cost of $ 1 0  for each plan 
participant. However, an employer with only 10 plan 
participants was treated as having incurred a cost of 
$15 per year for each plan participant because the $150 
minimum annual cost had to be shared by only 1 0  plan 
participants.
High-cost Qualified Plans. The initial cost of 
entering the system was assumed to be $75 per plan 
participant for high-cost qualified plans. After 
entering the system, the annual fee for low-cost 
qualified plans was treated as the starting point for 
determining the annual fee for high-cost qualified 
plans. An additional annual charge of $2,500 per 
employer was used to represent actuarial and other costs
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associated with the more complex and, therefore, more 
costly qualified plans. These costs were assumed to be 
evenly allocated among all plan participants.
Simplified Employee Plans. Simplified employee 
plans were assumed to have no plan administration costs. 
This assumption probably caused underestimation of plan 
costs, but as described earlier, this assumption 
allowed the marginal cost of the two qualified plans to 
be estimated conservatively.
State Tax Policy Factor
As discussed in Chapter 4, state policy with 
respect to the taxation of retirement benefits varies 
considerably among states . 2 3  Some states tax plan 
distributions as ordinary income; that i s , plan 
distributions are treated the same as income from other 
sources. Other states allow some or all plan 
distributions to escape taxation. These differences 
could be significant considerations for employers making 
firm location decisions or for geographically mobile 
employees. Also, state tax policies might be used to 
help explain wage differentials among states. For these 
reasons, the first research question was posed, and 
state tax policy was used as a factor in the 
experimental design.
23See Chapters 2 and 3 for a more detailed 
discussion of the theoretical basis and economic impact, 
respectively, of retirement benefit payments.
Investigation of the possible effects of the income 
tax statutes in each of the fifty states would have been 
extremely time consuming and perhaps less informative 
than a broader approach to the influence of state 
taxation on employer cost. Therefore, each subject was 
randomly assigned to a state, but observations were 
grouped according to a broader, three-level 
classification system for analysis.
The first state tax policy level included states 
with no state income t a x . Obviously, this policy 
represented an extreme method of taxing distributions. 
The second level of the state tax policy factor included 
states that tax plan distributions at ordinary income 
rates for state tax purposes. This policy can be viewed 
as another extreme method of taxing retirement plan 
benefits. The third level of the state tax policy 
factor included all of the remaining states. These 
remaining states fall between the extremes of the first 
two levels . 2 4
THE SYSTEM
Simulation has long been used to find the effects 
of changes in variables when analytical solutions are 
either impossible or difficult to determine [Naylor et
24Chapter 4 contains a detailed discussion of how 
states were assigned to each of the three levels of the 
state tax policy factor.
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a l . , 1969]. The research questions in this study 
presented such a situation because of the large number 
of variables which combine to produce plan cost. This 
section validates the model used to simulate employer 
costs by describing the system and its components and, 
thereby, demonstrating that the model adequately 
represents the actual system that produces employer 
retirement plan costs.
In computer simulation, the variables of interest
are called factors or responses depending on how they
are used in the model. Naylor et a l . [1969] gave a
simple, but informative, description of these two types
of variables:
If our experiment is designed to answer the 
question, how does a change in X affect Y, 
then X is a factor and Y is a response. In an 
experiment with a computer simulation model a 
response must of necessity be an endogenous 
(output) variable, whereas a factor will 
normally be a parameter or an exogenous 
(input) variable or some property of its 
probability distribution.
By defining a system and simulating system responses,
conclusions can be drawn as to the effects of system
inputs, or factors, upon system output, or responses.
A general model was defined in Chapter 1 that
describes the way inputs to the system of employer costs
and employee benefits result in system output. The
inputs to the system are employer and employee
attributes and the system output is employer cost.
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Employer cost was defined as the ratio of total employer 
contributions, stated in terms of future value on the 
date of plan separation, to total after-tax employee 
benefits, also stated in terms of future value on the 
date of plan separation. That is, the response variable 
in this study is an index of employer cost and can be 
viewed as the average employer contribution required to 
pay one after-tax dollar of retirement benefit.
Model Validation In General
The initial problem was to determine which 
attributes, or variables, affect the system output, 
employer cost. In the model used for this study, inputs 
were assumed to be of two types:
1 . employer attributes and
2 . employee attributes.
These two types of variables are represented in the 
discussion that follows by a and 0, respectively.
The system can be represented, as in Figure 5-2, in 
terms of (1 ) employer contributions to retirement 
arrangements and (2 ) after-tax benefits received by 
employees. The system presented in Figure 5-2, while 
conceptually appealing because of its simplicity, is of 
limited value in the simulation of actual subject 
responses. The subsystem descriptions below were used 
to write the computer program, represented by Figure 
5-1, that was used to simulate small employer costs.
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The Subsystems
Recall that in Equation 1-1, Rfor^, 0n)
represented the future value of all employer 
contributions and , 0n) represented
R(alf 0 n ) less plan costs and the total amount of
tax on R(a1( 0n ). The future value of all employer
contributions and the tax paid on the future value of 
all employer contributions is dependent upon not only 
employer contributions but also upon certain other 
employer and employee characteristics. Therefore, the 
employer and employee characteristics of interest are 
those which affect the accumulation of assets to be 
distributed to employees and those which affect the 
amount of tax employees must pay. The primary 
determinants of plan cost, using the notation of 
Equation 1-1, are summarized in Figure 5-3. The reasons 
these variables were included in the response variable 
computation will become evident as the components, or 
subsystems, of the response variable are examined. 
Equation 1-1 is restated below:
R («!, o ? / ami Pi* P2* Pn)c (1-1)
G (°l' 0t2 • am' Pi* P2* • • • $ P n)
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where
C = an index of the cost of providing
after-tax benefits to employees,
R = the function that defines the
relationship between the future value of 
employer contributions and two types of 
variables: (1 ) employer attributes
to and (2 ) employee attributes 0  ^ to
^ n '
G = the function that defines the
relationship between the after-tax amount 
received by an employee and three types 
of variables: (1 ) employer attributes otj
to am and (2 ) employee attributes 0-± to
0n>
arm = employer attribute m,
0n = employee attribute n, and
m = the total number of employer attributes,
and
n = the total number of employee attributes.
Equation 1-1 and Figure 5-2 suggest that the system of 
interest can be described in terms of at least two 
subsystems: (1 ) an employer contribution subsystem and
(2) an employee benefit subsystem. The first subsystem 
is represented by the numerator in Equation 1-1 and the 
top part of Figure 5-2. The second subsystem is 
represented by the denominator in Equation 1-1 and the 
lower part of Figure 5-2.
Employer Contribution Subsystem. The employer 
contribution subsystem begins with an employer 
contribution to a retirement arrangement and ends with 
the distribution of plan assets. The variables of
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interest, therefore, are those variables which affect 
this flow.
Plan costs— When an employer establishes a 
retirement arrangement, some initial costs may be 
incurred, some fixed and some variable. Later, plan 
maintenance costs are incurred; these too may be fixed 
or variable. For the purposes of this study, all plan 
costs were assumed to be related to the type of plan 
used (an experimental design factor) and the number of 
plan participants (an employer attribute).
Plan earnings— Plan asset accumulation, or the 
earning process, was treated as a simple process during 
which assets are contributed annually by employers by 
applying an employer contribution percentage (an 
employer attribute) to an employee salary (an employee 
attribute). These contributions were assumed to earn 
some rate of return (an employer attribute) during an 
employee plan participation period (an employee 
attribute). At the end of the asset accumulation 
period, plan assets were assumed to be distributed in a 
lump sum.
The employer contribution subsystem can be 
represented, as in Figures 5-1 and 5-2, as a series of 
contributions by an employer, some contributions going 
to cover plan expenses, followed by a plan earning 
process. The asset accumulation stage ends with the
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distribution of plan assets to a plan participant. The 
future value of all plan administration costs for a 
given plan participant plus the amount distributed to 
the plan participant forms the numerator, R, of the 
response variable, c.
Employee Benefit Subsystem. The employee benefit 
subsystem can be analyzed in a manner similar to the 
employer contribution subsystem. The subsystem begins, 
as shown in Figures 5-1 and 5-2, with a pre-tax 
distribution from a retirement arrangement, i.e., one of 
the outputs of the employer contribution subsystem. The 
pre-tax distribution is then reduced by the federal and 
state income taxes applicable to the lump sum 
distribution. The taxes extracted at the federal and 
state levels is dependent upon the amount of the 
pre-tax distribution (an output of the previous 
subsystem), plan type (a design factor), applicable 
state income tax rules (an employee attribute which is 
conditioned upon the state tax policy factor), employee 
filing status (an employee attribute), and taxable 
income from other sources after plan separation (an 
employee attribute).
Programming The System
The basic elements of the program used to simulate 
subject responses are discussed below. Figures 5-1 and 
5-2 show these elements in flowchart form.
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The first step was to select a cell in the 
experimental design. This determined plan type, with 
corresponding administration costs, and the list of 
states for which a state tax could be computed.
The next step was to select values for each of the 
relevant employer and employee attributes. This was 
done by randomly sampling from empirical distributions 
for each of the employer and employee attributes.
Based on the selected values of the employer and 
employee attributes, in each simulation iteration, the 
employer contribution amounts were calculated. This 
calculation was done separately for administration costs 
and for those contributions which, ultimately, were 
distributed to employees. Administration costs were 
assumed to be made up of initial-year plan costs and 
annual plan costs. Pre-tax distribution amounts paid to 
employees were computed on the basis of employer 
contribution percentage, plan rate of return, and 
employee salary. Contributions were then checked for 
statutory limitations on employer contributions . 2 5  In 
each ca s e , the future value of plan administration costs 
was added to pre-tax distributions to form the 
numerator, R(a^, 0n), of the response variable.
The next step was to compute the after-tax amount, 
G( a lf . . . , (3n ) , received by the employee based on the
25These limitations were discussed in Chapter 4.
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pre-tax distribution amount and the employer and 
employee attributes determined earlier. G(a l 7  . .., 0 n ) 
is merely the pre-tax distribution amount less the 
federal and state income taxes as shown in Figure 5-1. 
R(crlf 0n) was then divided by Gfat!, /?n ) to
calculate the cost index, C. A total of 3000 
observations were collected for each cell in the 
experimental design.
A SAMPLE ITERATION
Suppose that the procedure outlined above has been 
followed. Further, assume that the random selection of 
values resulted in the following values for a low-cost 
qualified plan in a state which does not tax plan 
distributions:
= 15 plan participants,
at2 = a 9 percent rate of return on plan
assets
a 3
02
01
a 6  percent employer contribution rate 
1 2  years of plan participation, 
a married, filing jointly filing status,
03 $ 2 2 , 0 0 0  of taxable income from other 
sources after plan separation,
04
05
Texas, and
$74,476 of salary during the years of 
plan participation.
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Employer Contribution Subsystem
The future value of all plan contributions made by 
the employer can be calculated. The employee's $74,476 
salary and the employer's 6  percent contribution rate 
result in a $4,469 annual employer contribution, not 
including the employer's contribution for the employee's 
pro rata share of plan administration costs. Using the 
9 percent rate of return on plan assets for 12 years of 
plan participation, the $4,4 69 of annual employer 
contribution would grow to a pre-tax distribution amount 
of $90,000. If plan administration costs are assumed to 
be $10 per participant with a $150 minimum annual charge 
to the employer, and if the number of plan participants 
is assumed constant, the future value of plan 
administration costs, on a per employee basis, can be 
calculated. This amount, $201, increases the 
employer's cost. In this case, the cost of the pre-tax 
distribution would be increased to $90,210 by 
administration costs. That is, employers were assumed 
to make contributions to cover all plan costs in 
addition to a contribution based on employee salary.
The contributions based on employee salary remain in the 
plan and earn some rate of return. The amounts 
accumulated for an employee's benefit are later 
distributed as shown in Figure 5-2. Total plan cost, 
i.e., R(a1# 0 n ) , then can be compared to the
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amount that actually reached the employee, G (alf ..-0n ) , 
after federal and state taxes are paid.
Employee Benefit Subsystem
Determining an after-tax distribution requires 
merely the calculation of any federal and state tax on 
the plan distribution. Continuing with the above 
facts, note that filing status, income from other 
sources, and distribution amount are the same as for 
Example 4-1. Recall that the total tax in Example 4-1, 
using ten year forward averaging and 1986 tax rates, was 
$15,449. This total tax was the sum of a $2,739 tax on 
income from other sources and a $12,710 tax on the 
$90,000 lump sum distribution. There would be no state 
income tax under the facts assumed here.
After subtracting both federal and state income 
taxes from the pre-tax distribution, the employee in 
this example would be left with $77,290 of after-tax 
benefits. That is, G (alf ..., /?n ) is $77,290 (i.e., 
$90,000 - $12,710) in this example.
The Index. C
The cost index, C, defined earlier to be the ratio 
of R(alf 0 n ) to G(alf ..., 0 n ) , now can be
calculated. In this example, C is equal to 1.25 (i.e., 
$90,000/$77,290).26 One possible interpretation of this
26This result was based on the rounded amounts used 
in this example.
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index is that, on average, the employer contributed 
about $1.25 to pay $1.00 of after-tax benefits to this 
employee. Figure 5-4 uses the flowchart presented 
earlier in Figure 5-1 to trace the employer 
contributions in the above example through the system.
As a quick illustration of how much difference a 
shift from one cell of the experimental design to 
another can make, assume that the random number 
generation process above had resulted in the same values 
of the model variables during an iteration for a 
simplified employee plan in a state that does not tax 
plan distributions.
Following the same procedure as before, the future 
value of all employer contributions would be $90,000. 
Assuming no administration costs for simplified employee 
plans, this value, without further adjustment, is 
R ( a lr ..., Pn ) - The tax on the $90,000 distribution, as 
determined in Example 4-2, is $34,064 (i.e., a tax of
$36,803 on all income less a tax of $2,739 attributable 
to income other than the plan distribution). This value 
of G(a^, ..., Pn) yields an index of 1.6089817 (i.e.,
$90, 000/$55 , 936) . The cost incurred by the emjjloyer to 
pay $ 1 . 0 0  of after-tax benefit to this employee was, on 
average, $1.61.
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VARIABLE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS
Earlier subsections described the theoretical 
justification for including each of the variables in the 
model of employer cost by defining the system and 
subsystems of employer retirement arrangement cost.
Also, the general approach to programming the model was 
described. This section gives the sources of the 
variable frequency distributions used to randomly select 
employer and employee attributes for each observation. 
Number Of Plan Participants,
Simplified employee plans were created specifically 
to lower the cost to small employers of providing 
retirement benefits to employees. Therefore, this study 
was concerned with the population of small employers in 
the United States. Congress did not describe what was 
meant by the term "small employers," and this omission 
complicated the evaluation process considerably. Should 
size be evaluated in terms of assets, number of 
employees, profit margins, or some other variable? No 
guidance was given by the enacting legislation, but some 
conclusions can be drawn from subsequent legislation.
As described in chapter 4, TRA 1986 brought 
simplified employee plans more in line with qualified 
plan treatment. One type of qualified plan that was 
directly compared by TRA 1986 to simplified employee 
plans was the §401(k) plans already available to
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employers. Simplified employee plans were brought into 
almost perfect alignment with §401(k) plans when 
simplified employee plans have 25 or fewer 
participants. 2*7 This treatment appears to provide 
strong evidence as to current congressional thought.
Based on the evidence of congressional intent 
mentioned above, this study took as the population of 
small employers, those United States employers with 25 
or fewer employees. The characteristics of interest for 
these employers, and their employees, were described 
earlier. The frequency of occurrence for one employee 
to twenty-five employees, using one-employee increments, 
was obtained from the United States Bureau of the 
Census [1986].
Rate Of Return On Plan Assets, a 2
The distribution of a2 was based on a random sample 
of mutual funds with long-term growth as a stated 
objective. Average returns during a recent ten-year 
period for 30 funds were used to approximate the returns 
available to retirement arrangements. These returns 
seemed appropriate because of the common objective of 
long-term growth. Returns were obtained from 
Wiesenberger [1986].
27See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of 
the federal tax rules for such plans.
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Employer Annual Contribution Percentage. a3
The frequency distribution of the annual employer 
contribution percentage variable was based on the 
annual contributions of a sample of 168 employers with 
4 0 1 (k) plans [Hewitt Associates, 1986]. Employers were 
assumed to have made the same percentage contribution 
during the entire plan participation period.
Lencrth Of Plan Participation. 8 ^
A uniform distribution ranging from 5 to 35 years 
of plan participation was used for (3^. A uniform 
distribution was selected because of the difficulty of 
projecting current plan participation periods into the 
future. Recent economic, social, and geographic trends 
make any projections highly suspect [S e e , General 
Accounting Office, 1986], and the use of a uniform 
distribution allowed all participation periods to be 
equally represented.
The lower limit of this frequency distribution was 
selected to avoid problems associated with minimum plan 
participation requirements. The upper limit was 
intended to be a reasonable approximation of the maximum 
working life of an employee.
Employee Filing Status, flo
An empirical distribution based on all United 
States taxpayers 55 years of age and older was used for 
$2 [U. S. Department of Health and Human Services,
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1985]. The effect of p2 on federal tax computations was
discussed in Chapter 4. In addition to the effect on
the federal tax, many state tax computations are
affected by taxpayer filing status.
Taxable Income From Other Sources.
An empirical distribution based on all taxpayers in 
the United States aged 55 and over was used for 
[U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1985]. 
Income from other sources has an effect, in some cases, 
on the rate at which plan distributions are taxed.
State Income Tax,
A state was assigned to each observation on the 
basis of the total number of returns filed in each 
state. This frequency distribution was chosen to 
represent the current and future probability that a plan 
lump sum distribution would be taxed by a given state. 
The experimental design determined which states were 
treated as possible occurrences for each observation. 
That is, the frequency distribution for p4 was actually 
three conditional frequency distributions. After an 
experimental design cell was selected, only one of the 
three state frequency distributions was used to 
determine which state tax rules would be used to 
determine the state income tax on plan distributions.
For example, during a series of iterations in cell C 2 2  
only states in level 2 of the state tax policy factor
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were considered. Figure 4-2 lists the states in each of 
the three state tax policy categories. The state income 
tax variable should not be confused with the state tax 
policy factor used in the experimental design. The two 
are related, but the state income tax variable may take 
on any of 50 values, although only a subset of the 50 
states was possible in any given experimental design 
cell. The state tax policy factor was used to group 
responses into three levels for analysis.
Employee Salary. £5
The frequency distribution for the annual employee 
salary variable was based on the annual salaries of 
employees in a sample of 51 4 0 1 (k) plans which included 
over 4 00,000 employees [Hewitt Associates, 1986] .
Employee salary, in conjunction with the employer 
contribution percentage was used to determine employer 
contributions.
DATA ANALYSIS
The procedure used in this study to analyze 
employer cost involved analysis of simulated subject 
responses that resulted from the combination of 
empirical and theoretical distributions for employer and 
employee attributes. Because responses were determined 
in a random manner, statistical testing was appropriate
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[See, Cochran and Cox, 1957; Kleijner, 1975; and 
Naylor, 1969].
HYPQthepQi?
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a widely accepted 
method for testing the equality of group means when 
certain assumptions are met. This technique was used to 
test the following null hypotheses:
Ho 1 : Plan type has no effect on employer cost,
C;
H0 2 : State tax policy has no effect on
employer cost, C;
Rejection of any null hypothesis suggests the need for
further investigation to determine the nature of any
effects. Additional investigation included post hoc
comparisons of cell means, e.g., Scheffe [1953].
Interpretation Of Results
The interpretation of null hypothesis rejection is 
straightforward and follows from earlier chapters. The 
following subsections summarize these conclusions.
Plan Ty p e . Rejection of the null hypothesis for 
the plan type factor would indicate that plan type 
does, in fact, affect plan cost. That is, if the plan 
type has a significant impact on plan cost, Congress may 
have achieved its goal of providing an incentive for 
small employers to offer retirement benefits. Of 
course, this assumes that the effect of the plan type 
factor was in the direction Congress intended.
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Rejection of the null hypothesis of no plan type effect 
as a result of higher plan costs for simplified employee 
plans, instead of lower costs for simplified employee 
plans, would indicate that Congress did not accomplish 
its intent; indeed, this result would indicate that 
Congress created a plan type that was more costly for 
small employers. A failure to reject the plan type 
hypothesis would indicate that the creation of 
simplified employee plans may have been ineffective for 
achieving Congress's goal.
State Tax Policy. Rejection of the null hypothesis 
of no differences among the levels of the state tax 
factor may be interpreted as evidence that state 
taxation has a significant effect on the cost of 
providing after-tax benefits to employees. Such results 
would indicate that certain groups of states may have a 
relative labor cost advantage over other groups of 
states, at least with respect to the retirement plan 
costs investigated by this study.
ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
This study relied heavily upon two assumptions.
The first assumption was that retirement plan costs 
incurred by employers are affected by the federal and 
state taxes imposed on employees. The second basic 
assumption concerns the definition of small employers,
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the intended beneficiaries of simplified employee plans. 
To the extent that these assumptions were not 
appropriate, the conclusions which can be drawn from the 
results of this study are limited. For the reasons 
stated earlier in this chapter, the assumptions and 
limitations appear appropriate for the purposes of this 
study.
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FIGURE 5-3 
DETERMINANTS OF PLAN COST
a! = number of plan participants,
a2 = rate of return on plan assets,
c* 3 = employer contribution percentage,
02 = length of plan participation
02 = employee filing status,
02 = taxable income from other sources after
plan separation,
0 4 = applicable state income tax, and
0 5  = employee salary during plan
participation period.
FIGURE 5-4 
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS
This chapter presents data that resulted from 
simulating after-tax, small employer, retirement 
arrangement costs and the results of statistical tests 
on that data. The data indicates that simplified 
employee plans have not, in general, provided a low-cost 
retirement arrangement alternative for small employers 
as Congress intended.
The chapter begins with a description of the data 
that was generated by the simulation procedures 
described in earlier chapters. Then, a detailed 
discussion of the results is presented. Next, the 
results of some statistical tests are presented. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the study.
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SUMMARY OF THE COMPUTER SIMULATION AND ITS RESULTS
As described in Chapter 5, the computer simulation 
procedures produced responses, that is, cost indices, 
for three plan types in three categories of states. In 
each simulation iteration, total employer inputs, or 
plan costs, were compared to the after-tax benefits that 
an employee would receive as a result of the assumed 
employer payments.
The employer payments for each iteration of the 
simulation were assumed to be the result of stochastic 
processes which yield values for all relevant employer 
characteristics . 2 8  Likewise, the tax payments made by 
employees, and, therefore, the after-tax employee 
benefits that result from employer contributions, were 
assumed to result from stochastic processes that yield 
all relevant employee characteristics.2®
Output Categories
The plan types considered were low-cost qualified 
plans (LCQPs), such as defined contribution plans, 
high-cost qualified plans (HCQPs), such as defined 
benefit plans, and simplified employee plans (SEPs).
28The employer characteristics of interest included 
the number of plan participants, the rate of return on 
plan assets, and the employer's annual plan 
contribution percentage.
29The employee characteristics of interest included 
the employee's years of plan participation, filing 
status, taxable income from other sources, salary, and 
applicable state tax rules.
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The states in each of the three state income tax policy 
categories differ with respect to policies for taxing 
retirement plan distributions.
States in the first state income tax policy 
category (NT) do not tax retirement arrangement 
distributions. States in the second and third 
categories (01 and MIX, respectively) tax plan 
distributions, but 0 1  states treat plan distributions as 
ordinary income while MIX states allow the tax on 
certain plan distributions to be computed, under a 
variety of methods, in such a way that plan 
distributions may receive more favorable tax treatment, 
assuming equal tax rates, than distributions in OI 
states. That is, under certain circumstances, 
distributions in MIX states are taxed at less than 
ordinary state income tax rates either because some form 
of state averaging computation applies to certain plan 
distributions or because state income tax laws allow 
some distributions to escape the state income tax 
entirely. Plan distribution taxation for specific 
states was presented in Table 4-1.
Number of observations
For each combination of state income tax policy and 
plan type, 3,000 observations were generated by a 
computer program designed to calculate employer cost 
indices for the system of employer inputs and after-tax
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plan outputs . 3 0  In all, 27,000 observations were 
generated.
Given the large number of observations and the 
standard deviation of these observations, the overall 
mean index of plan cost, $1.73, could be estimated to 
within about $0.01 with 99 percent confidence. The 
number of observations for each combination of plan type 
and state income tax policy (i.e., 3,000) was selected 
because of computing time 1 imitations and because 
preliminary simulation runs of much shorter duration 
indicated that the overall index mean could be estimated 
with the high degree of precision indicated above using 
approximately 27,000 observations.
The efficiency of using 27,000 observations to 
estimate the overall sample mean was reviewed after all 
observations were collected. The results of this review 
indicated that additional observations would not have 
efficiently reduced the precision of the overall sample 
mean estimate.
As an example of the efficiency of the sample size 
used, consider the following 99 percent confidence 
interval estimates of the sample mean for the overall 
cost index: 9,000 observations (i.e., 1,000
observations for each combination of plan type and state
30The simulated system was described in detail in 
Chapter 5.
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income tax policy) resulted in an estimate of the sample 
mean accurate to within $0.0198; 24,300 observations 
(i.e., 2,700 observations for each combination of plan 
type and state income tax policy) resulted in an 
estimate of the sample mean accurate to within $ 0 .0 1 2 2 ; 
26,100 observations (i.e., 2,900 observations for each 
combination of plan type and state income tax policy) 
resulted in an estimate of the sample mean accurate to 
within $0.0118; 27,000 observations (i.e., 3,000 
observations for each combination of plan type and state 
income tax policy) resulted in an estimate of the sample 
mean accurate to within $0.0116. These results indicate 
that the sample of 27,000 observations was both 
efficient and effective for achieving the purposes of 
this study.
Means And Standard Deviations
The means and standard deviations for all 
combinations of plan type and state income tax policy 
are presented in Table 6-1 and are plotted with plan 
type on the X-axis in Figure 6-1 and state income tax 
policy on the X-axis in Figure 6-2. The average index 
of plan cost for all observations was $1.73. The lowest 
average plan cost index, $1.32, resulted from low-cost 
qualified plans in states that do not tax plan 
distributions. The highest average plan cost index,
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$ 2 .0 2 , resulted from high-cost qualified plans in states 
that tax plan distributions as ordinary income.
In general, simplified employee plans were found to 
be less costly than high-cost qualified plan 
alternatives but more expensive than low-cost qualified 
plan alternatives. These results support one of the 
a priori expectations of this study: simplified
employee plans do not, on average, result in plan costs 
that are lower than those which result from qualified 
plan alternatives that were available when simplified 
employee plans were created by Congress.
The ratio of employer inputs, or costs, to 
after-tax employee benefits was used as an index of the 
costs small employers incur to provide retirement plan 
benefits to their employees. This ratio represents the 
average cost of providing a dollar of after-tax plan 
benefit. That is, the response variable merely is the 
ratio of costs to after-tax employee benefits . 3 1  
Validation Procedures
To ensure the empirical validity of the computer 
program used to generate responses, a random sample of 
responses, i.e., cost indices, was calculated manually 
for each combination of plan type and state tax policy, 
and the results were compared to the responses generated
31The response variable was described in detail in 
Chapter 5.
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by the computer program. In addition, response 
aggregates were reviewed for reasonableness.
The statistics presented in Table 6-1, in addition 
to providing a description of the data that resulted 
from the computer simulation procedures, serve as a 
partial check on the conceptual validity of the model 3 2  
and the empirical validity of the computer program 3 3  
used to generate observations. The means in Table 6-1 
are presented in Figures 6-1 and 6-2 and the 
relationships shown are discussed in the following 
section of this chapter.
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
This section of the chapter serves three purposes:
(1 ) it documents the reasonableness of the data 
generated and, thereby, serves as a validity check on 
the theoretical model and computer program; (2 ) it
highlights and explains any nonintuitive relationships; 
and (3) it gives a more detailed description of the 
results that, in the following chapter, will serve as a 
basis for some conclusions and recommendations to 
federal and state tax policy-makers.
32A conceptual validation of the model was presented 
in Chapter 5.
33The primary empirical validation procedure relied 
upon, as mentioned earlier, was the manual recalculation 
of samples of computer generated responses.
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The Effect Of State Taxation. A short description 
of certain differences among state categories may be 
helpful at this point. Note that, ceteris paribus, plan 
costs for LCQPs in OI states could be expected to be 
higher than the costs for similar plans in MIX states 
because qualified plan distributions in MIX states get 
some tax relief at the state level while distributions 
in OI states are taxed at ordinary state income tax 
rates . 3 4
Focusing for the moment on the LCQPs in Figures 
6 - 1  and 6 - 2 , the expected value of the federal tax 
reasonably could be expected to be approximately the 
same for all state categories because all distributions 
were assumed to have been made from low-c st qualified 
plans. Therefore, any difference in average plan cost 
indices across state income tax categories must have 
been attributable solely to differences in state 
taxation or random variation. The higher costs for 
low-cost qualified plans in OI states ($1.42022) and 
MIX states ($1.42121), then, when compared to the costs 
of low-cost qualified plans in NT states ($1.31829), is 
not surprising. However, why would the average plan 
costs for low-cost qualified plans in OI states and MIX 
states be approximately equal?
34See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the state tax 
relief available to qualified plans in the third state 
income tax policy category.
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One part of the answer to the question posed above 
is, simply, that state tax rates in MIX states are 
higher, in general, than state tax rates in OI states.
As can be seen from Figures 6-1 and 6-2 and Table 6-1, 
the preferential treatment accorded qualified plans in 
MIX states, i.e., when compared to the treatment of 
qualified plans in OI states, is offset by the higher 
tax rates imposed by MIX states.
To confirm that this was, indeed, the reason for 
similar costs in these two state income tax policy 
categories, the maximum income tax rate for each 0 1  
state and each MIX state was weighted by the probability 
that each state in these two categories would occur for 
any single iteration of the computer simulation. This 
value was used to compute an average maximum income tax 
rate for states in the OI and MIX state income tax 
categories. As suspected, the average maximum income 
tax rate for MIX states, approximately 9.3 percent, was 
significantly higher than the average maximum tax rate 
for 01 states, approximately 5*5 percent.
Another factor that caused higher state taxes in 
MIX states was that the preferential state income tax 
treatment that was used to place some states in the MIX 
state income tax policy category did not apply in all 
cases because of tax minimization algorithms that were 
included in the computer simulation program. The
116
purpose of these algorithms was to simulate actual 
taxpayer behavior.
For example, some MIX states do not tax lump sum 
qualified plan distributions if the special federal 
averaging treatment for such distributions is elected . 3 5  
However, the special federal averaging procedure is not 
optimal in all cases because, for example, it requires 
that higher, single taxpayer rates be used to calculate 
the tax on qualifying distributions even if taxpayers 
otherwise qualify for the lower rates that apply to 
married taxpayers. Under certain circumstances, 
taxpayers reasonably could be expected to have plan 
benefits taxed as ordinary income 3 6  instead of under the 
special federal averaging method.
In the special cases described above, the state tax 
treatment would resemble the state income tax treatment 
in OI states, i.e., ordinary state income tax treatment. 
However, this ordinary state income tax treatment would 
apply only to specific iterations with, perhaps, unusual 
facts and circumstances, and such instances of 0 1 -type 
state income taxation in a MIX state would not require 
reclassification of a MIX state as an 01 state. Indeed,
3 5 Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, and West 
Virginia have adopted this approach to taxing qualified 
plan distributions.
36See Chapter 4 for a discussion of other possible 
tax treatments of such plan distributions.
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one of the characteristics of MIX taxation is that under 
some circumstances certain states allow qualifying 
distributions to receive preferential treatment and 
under some circumstances these states tax distributions 
as ordinary income in a manner similar to OI states.
The point is that the average state income tax in MIX 
states is higher than that which might be casually 
predicted.
This possibility, analytically deduced, was 
empirically tested during a model validation procedure 
in which those states that allow qualified lump sum 
distributions to escape taxation entirely, under certain 
circumstances, were separated from other MIX states, and 
costs in these states were analyzed for logical 
consistency. As expected, this subset of MIX states, 
i.e., the subset of states that allow qualified lump sum 
distributions taxed under the special federal averaging 
computation to escape state income taxation, had a 
slightly higher average cost index than NT states, a 
logical point of reference because NT states do not tax 
plan distributions.
The Effect Of Plan Type. Shifting the focus from 
state income tax policies, this subsection of the 
chapter is a discussion of the effect of plan type on 
employer costs. As mentioned earlier, and as shown in 
Figures 6-1 and 6-2, low-cost qualified plans in states
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that do not tax plan distributions have the lowest 
average plan cost. Low-cost qualified plan alternatives 
are more costly in OI and MIX states than in NT states. 
However, the difference in cost between low-cost 
qualified plans in OI states and MIX states is not 
statistically significant . 3 7
Figure 6-1 shows that for high-cost qualified plans 
the results are similar to the results that were 
obtained for low-cost qualified plans except that 
high-cost qualified plan indices were generally higher 
than low-cost qualified plan indices. Again, the 
high -cost qualified plan alternative that had the lowest 
average cost was in the NT state income tax policy 
category.
The reversal in order of plan cost indices in OI 
states and MIX states, although the differences were 
not statistically significant and probably are not 
significant in any practical sense, is interesting and 
supports the empirical validity of the computer program 
used to generate responses as well as the conceptual 
validity of the model. That is, low-cost qualified 
plans were slightly more costly in MIX states, a 
non-intuitive result that was explained above by the
37The results of the statistical analysis are 
presented later in this chapter.
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higher tax rates and certain tax-minimizing behavior of 
taxpayers in MIX states.
This result is logical because as more employer 
contributions go toward plan administration costs, i.e., 
as when employers switch to or initially adopt high-cost 
qualified plans, smaller distributions are available to 
employees. The resulting smaller distributions, i.e., 
smaller than the distributions that would have resulted 
under a low-cost qualified plan, ceteris paribus, are 
not as often exposed to the higher maximum tax rates 
applicable in MIX states.
Thus, the reversal in order of the cost indices 
for 01 states and MIX states as plan type is switched 
from LCQP to HCQP is a reasonable outcome although, 
perhaps, not intuitively obvious. Alternatively, the 
reversal could be solely attributable to random 
variation since the differences are not, after all, 
statistically significant.
As was true for qualified plans, simplified 
employee plans had the lowest average cost index in 
states that do not tax plan distributions. In 01 and 
MIX states, plan costs reasonably could be expected to 
be approximately equal except for state tax rate 
differences and other minor differences in state 
taxation such as the deductibility of the federal income 
tax for state income tax purposes.
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Figures 6-1 and 6-2 and Table 6 - 1  show that these 
expectations were born out in the computer simulation 
results. That is, simplified employee plans in 01 
states were found to be more costly, on average, than 
simplified employee plans in NT states. Simplified 
employee plans turned out to be even more costly in MIX 
states because of the higher tax rates in MIX states.
Perhaps the most significant observation that can 
be made about simplified employee plans is most apparent 
from Figure 6-1: state income tax policies appear most
likely to have some practical significance in the case 
of simplified employee plans. That is, as was the case 
for the two qualified plan alternatives examined 
previously, states that do not tax plan distributions 
appear to have a substantial cost advantage over OI and 
MIX states. However, the difference between the average 
plan cost in OI states and MIX states is much more 
pronounced for simplified employee plans is 
statistically significant. Therefore, employers in MIX 
states, and MIX state economies in general, may pay a 
big premium for the simplicity of adopting or 
maintaining simplified employee plans.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The data that resulted from the computer simulation 
was analyzed using a nested analysis of variance model
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with an equal number of replications for each 
combination of the levels of the state income tax policy 
factor and the plan type factor. This model was 
previously defined as
c ijk = u + s i + pj(i) + ek (ij) (1 - 2 )
where
= the cost index of the kth
observation for plan type j in 
state tax policy i,
U = the overall mean effect.
Si = the effect of the ith level of
factor S, the state tax policy 
effect,
Pj(i) = the effect of the jth level of
factor P, the plan type factor 
effect, within state tax policy i, 
and
ek(ij) = the random error present in the
kth observation for plan type j 
in state tax policy i.
ANOVA Results
In Chapter 5, two null hypotheses were stated.
Both hypotheses are restated below, and the results of 
statistical tests related to these hypotheses then are 
reported:
Ho 1 : Plan type has no effect on employer
co s t ;
Ho 2 : state income tax policy has no effect on
employer cost.
As shown in Table 6-2, the effects of plan type and 
state income tax policy were found to be significant at 
a .01 level of significance. That is, both omnibus null
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hypotheses, Hol and Ho 2 , were rejected, and further 
investigation was indicated to determine which of the 
plan and state factor levels differ.
Multiple Comparisons
Scheffe's test [1953] was used for purposes of 
multiple comparisons. With few exceptions the null 
hypothesis of equal plan cost indices was rejected for 
levels of the plan cost factor and the state income tax 
policy factor. The results of these tests are 
summarized in Figure 6-3.
These results demonstrate statistically what is 
visually apparent in Figures 6-1 and 6-2. That is, for 
qualified plans, both high-cost qualified plans and 
low-cost qualified plans, there is no significant 
difference between the costs incurred by employers in OI 
states and employers in MIX states. Also, there is no 
significant difference between the costs incurred by 
employers in MIX states to provide benefits under 
high-cost qualified plans and under simplified employee 
plans. In other states, i.e., NT states and 01 states, 
simplified employee plans are significantly less 
expensive than high-cost qualified plan alternatives. 
Low-cost qualified plan alternatives are the least 
expensive alternatives in all state categories.
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Sensitivity Of The Results
For reasons mentioned in Chapter 5, small 
employers were defined as those United States employers 
with 2 5 or fewer employees. Because part of the cost of 
adopting a qualified plan, i.e., part of the 
administration costs, were assumed fixed, the relative 
advantage of low-cost qualified plan alternatives over 
simplified employee plans reasonably could be expected 
to be highly sensitive to the number of plan 
participants. To guard against the possibility that the 
conclusions of this study were unreasonably dependent 
upon the maximum number of employees used, all of the 
tests described in this chapter were performed on two 
subsets of the original data.
The first subset resulted from selecting only those 
observations that had 15 or fewer plan participants.
The second subset resulted from selecting only those 
observations that had 1 0  or fewer plan participants. 
Similar conclusions could have been drawn from the 
results of statistical tests and visual inspection of 
the data in both subsets of the original data. That is, 
plan costs proved to be fairly resilient to changes in 
the maximum number of plan participants.
Simplified employee plans were assumed to contain 
no fixed plan administration cost, and therefore, 
changes in the number of plan participants did not
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affect the average costs of this type of plan.
High-cost qualified plan alternatives were assumed to 
have a relatively high fixed cost of plan 
administration, and the mean cost of these plans could 
be expected to be affected by lowering the number of 
plan participants over which plan costs could be spread. 
Likewise, low-cost qualified plan alternatives were 
expected to be affected by lowering the maximum number 
of plan participants, but this group was not expected to 
be as sensitive to changes in the number of plan 
participants as the high-cost qualified plan 
alternatives.
The expected relationships were supported by the 
analysis of sensitivity of plan cost to the maximum 
number of plan participants. High-cost and low-cost 
qualified plan alternatives became more costly as the 
maximum number of plan participants decreased, but on 
both subsets of the original data, low-cost qualified 
plan alternatives remained the lowest plan option in all 
three state categories.
Assumptions
In the model described above, the random error 
term, j , is assumed to be normally distributed with
mean zero and variance o 2 . 3 8  The normality assumption
38For a discussion of the assumptions of the ANOVA 
model see, for example, Berenson, et al. [I9 8 3  PP- 137- 
173], Tabachnick and Fidell [1983 pp. 77-85], or Hicks
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was tested using a Kolmagorov-Smirnov test 3 9  and the 
hypothesis of normally distributed residuals was 
rejected at a . 0 1  level.
Although no pattern was apparent from an 
examination of a stem-and-leaf plot of the residuals, 
five transformations of the dependent variable were used 
in an attempt to find a more appropriate dependent 
variable for the ANOVA model. The transformations were 
the square, square root, natural logarithm, reciprocal 
root and reciprocal of the original d a t a .
This attempt to transform the data satisfactorily 
was unsuccessful, and although the ANOVA model is robust 
against normality and variance assumption violations4 0 , 
a number of steps were taken to assure that the results 
of the statistical tests were not misleading. These 
additional steps are outlined below and produced results 
that are consistent with the results reported elsewhere 
in this chapter.
Conover [1980, p. 337] suggested an alternative in 
situations where the assumptions of parametric tests 
are not met and no nonparametric test is available. The
[1982 pp. 228-232].
39See Conover [1980, pp. 344-384] for a general 
description of such tests.
40Berenson [1982] found, for example, that shape, 
i.e., symmetrical versus nonsymmetrical, has less 
influence on the ANOVA procedure than does tail density.
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alternative suggested is to rank the data and "apply the 
usual analysis of variance to the ranks." This 
procedure was followed, and as stated above, the results 
were consistent with those found using conventional 
ANOVA procedures.
SUMMARY
State income tax policy and plan type significantly 
affect plan cost. However, state income tax policy does 
not significantly affect plan costs when OI states are 
compared to MIX states, except in the case of simplified 
employee plans. This result, however, is probably due 
to the higher tax rates imposed by MIX states. This 
suggests that the more complex taxing schemes adopted in 
MIX states, in general, may not have been successful at 
reducing taxes on plan distributions. In general, plan 
costs are lowest in those states that do not tax plan 
distributions.
In all state categories low-cost qualified plan 
alternatives result in costs significantly lower than 
those costs that would have resulted from either 
high-cost qualified plan alternatives or simplified 
employee plans. High-cost qualified plan costs and 
simplified employee plan costs are approximately equal 
in MIX states. Under no state tax policy category are 
simplified employee plans the inexpensive retirement
127
plan alternative Congress intended.
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TABLE 6-1 
CELL MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Plan Type State Type Mean Cost 
Per Dollar 
Of Benefit
Standard
Deviatio]
LCQP NT $1.31829 0.24762
LCQP 0 1 $1.42022 0.30242
LCQP MIX $1.42121 0.36392
HCQP NT $1 . 85068 0 . 97522
HCQP OI $2.02069 1.25916
HCQP MIX $1.98234 1.06319
SEP NT $1.69644 0.27423
SEP 0 1 $1.84609 0 . 34234
SEP MIX $1.99077 0.42370
where
Plan type LCQP is a low-cost qualified p l a n ,
Plan type HCQP is a high-cost qualified plan,
Plan type SEP is a simplified employee p l a n ,
State type NT includes states that do not tax 
distributions,
State type OI includes states that tax
distributions as ordinary income, and
State type MIX includes states that have tax
policies other than those of state types NT 
and OI
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Source
State Tax Policy 
Plan Type
TABLE 6-2 
ANOVA RESULTS 
F value g-value
162.700 <.01
576.548 <.01
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TABLE 6-3
MULTIPLE COMPARISONS
Plan State Plan State Scheffe D-value
LCQP NT LCQP 0 1 < . 0 0 0 0 1 *
LCQP NT LCQP MIX < . 0 0 0 0 1 *
LCQP NT HCQP NT < . 0 0 0 0 1 *
LCQP NT SEP NT < . 0 0 0 0 1 *
LCQP OI LCQP MIX .98986
LCQP OI HCQP OI < . 0 0 0 0 1 *
LCQP OI SEP OI < . 0 0 0 0 1 *
LCQP MIX HCQP MIX < . 0 0 0 0 1 *
LCQP MIX SEP MIX < . 0 0 0 0 1 *
HCQP NT HCQP 0 1 < . 0 0 0 0 1 *
HCQP NT HCQP MIX < . 0 0 0 0 1 A
HCQP NT SEP NT < . 0 0 0 0 1 *
HCQP OI HCQP MIX . 09854
HCQP OI SEP OI < . 0 0 0 0 1 A
HCQP MIX SEP MIX .88971
SEP NT SEP 0 1 < . 0 0 0 0 1 A
SEP NT SEP MIX < . 0 0 0 0 1 A
SEP OI SEP MIX < . 0 0 0 0 1 A
* indicates a significant difference at a .01 level.
FIGURE 6 - 1  
RESPONSE MEANS BY PLAN TYPE
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FIGURE 6-2
RESPONSE MEANS BY STATE INCOME TAX POLICY
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CHAPTER 7
CONCIjUS ions
In 1978, Congress created a new type of retirement 
arrangement, the simplified employee plan. Congress's 
purpose was to encourage small employers to offer their 
employees retirement benefits. The primary enticement 
for small employers under a simplified employee plan was 
to be the administrative ease, at least in comparison to 
qualified retirement plans, with which simplified 
employee plans could be created and maintained.
This ease of administration wo u l d , Congress 
believed, result in lower administration costs a n d , 
thereby, encourage employers to offer retirement 
benefits to their employees. However, distributions 
from simplified employee plans were not allowed all of 
the tax benefits accorded more complex qualified 
retirement plans.
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Individual states have adopted a variety of 
policies for taxing distributions to employees from both 
simplified employee plans and qualified retirement 
plans. State tax policies that have been adopted range 
from taxing distributions from both qualified 
retirement plans and simplified employee plans as 
ordinary income to allowing all distributions to escape 
state taxation completely. A substantial number of 
states have adopted policies that fall between these two 
extremes.
This chapter summarizes a study reported in
previous chapters and draws upon that study to form
conclusions about prior legislation and tax policies and
to make suggestions for the future. Questions of the
type stated below are the subject of this chapter:
Are federal tax policies with respect to 
retirement arrangements consistent with 
traditional notions of tax equity?
Have smal1 employers received adequate inducements 
to offer retirement benefits to their employees?
Have states significantly distorted the effects of 
federally provided mechanisms for paying retirement 
benefits to employees?
What are the relative advantages to states of 
adopting one of the currently available state tax 
policies with respect to retirement benefits?
While not claiming to conclusively answer such
questions, the results obtained in this study help to
shed at least some light on the true cost of retirement
benefits, the real cost of such benefits being still
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hidden among the shadows of legislative intent, 
interstate competition for factors of production, and a 
variety of private and public actions with intended and 
unintended consequences.
The Chapter begins with a summary of the study 
reported in previous chapters. This section of the 
chapter is followed by sections on the implications of 
the study results and the limitations of the study.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of areas for 
future research.
SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
This research reports the results of a computer 
simulation of the costs small employers incur to provide 
after-tax retirement benefits to their employees. The 
purpose of this research was to answer two research 
questions:
1. Does retirement plan type affect the cost 
small employers incur to provide 
after-tax retirement benefits to 
employees?
2. Does state tax policy with respect to
retirement arrangements affect the cost
small employers incur to provide 
after-tax retirement benefits to 
employees?
The first question is, primarily, a federal tax 
policy issue concerning the effectiveness of simplified 
employee plans as a method for reducing small employer 
costs. The second question addressed federal and state
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tax policy issues by examining how state tax policies 
affect the cost of providing retirement benefits to 
employees under plan types defined by federal tax 
policies. similarly, the second research question 
addresses the issue of how state tax policies affect the 
implementation of federal tax policies.
A system of employer costs and employee benefits 
was defined so that the relationship between employer 
costs and employee benefits could be described and 
analyzed. A cost index was defined, equal to the ratio 
of employer inputs, or costs, to after-tax distributions 
to employees, with both costs and benefits stated in 
terms of their values on the date of the distribution of 
plan assets to employees.
Three categories of retirement arrangements were 
examined. Of the three categories examined, two 
included qualified retirement plans and one included 
simplified employee plans. One of the qualified 
retirement plan categories included low-cost qualified 
plan alternatives (LCQPs), for example, defined 
contribution plans. The other qualified retirement plan 
category included high-cost qualified plan alternatives 
(HCQPs), for example, defined benefit plans. The third 
retirement arrangement category included only simplified 
employee plans (SEPs) .
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Three categories of state tax policy with respect 
to retirement arrangements were examined. The first 
category (NT) included only those states that impose no 
income tax on distributions from the plan types 
examined. The second category (OI) included states at 
the other extreme, those states that tax all 
distributions at ordinary income tax rates. The third 
state tax policy category (MIX) included the remaining 
states that have some hybrid approach to taxing 
retirement arrangement distributions.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
Perhaps the primary observation that can be made 
about the effects of plan type and state income tax 
policy is that both appear to affect the cost of 
after-tax benefits paid to employees in the form of a 
lump sum distribution. Figures 6-1 and 6-2 capture the 
essence of the plan type and state income tax policy 
effects.
In general, low-cost qualified plan alternatives 
result in the lowest plan cost. Indeed, at an average 
cost of $1.95 per dollar of after-tax employee benefit, 
high-cost qualified plan costs are about 141 percent of 
low-cost qualified plan costs, which have an average 
cost of $1.39. At an average cost of $1.84, simplified 
employee plan costs are about 13 3 percent of low-cost
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qualified plan costs. That is, ignoring state income 
taxation for the moment, an employer with a low-cost 
qualified plan could expect to incur substantially lower 
retirement arrangement costs than an employer with a 
simplified employee plan or a high-cost qualified plan 
alternative.
One of the a priori expectations of this study was 
that simplified employee plans would prove to be more 
costly than all qualified plan alternatives. Clearly, 
this is not the case. Ignoring state income taxation, 
i.e., looking only at NT states, high-cost qualified 
plan costs are about 109 percent of simplified employee 
plan costs. If the state income tax policy factor is 
considered, simplified employee plans are about as 
costly as high-cost qualified plans in one group of 
states, MIX states.
In NT and OI states, simplified employee plans 
follow the overall pattern. Simplified employee plan 
costs in NT and 01 states are a little more than 90 
percent of the cost of high-cost qualified plans and 
about 130 percent of the cost of low-cost qualified 
plans. That is, under all three state tax policies 
low-cost qualified plan alternatives are, on average, 
less costly than simplified employee plans, and in MIX 
states simplified employee plan costs are about the same 
as high-cost qualified plan costs.
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In some sense, then, Congress was Incorrect to have 
focused on plan administration cost reduction as a 
method for increasing the benefits paid to the employees 
of small businesses. That is, at be s t , simplified 
employee plans achieve the goal of cost reduction only 
among the group of small businesses that wish to offer 
the most complex, and therefore most expensive, schemes 
for paying retirement benefits.
Given the legislatively imposed requirements for 
simplicity when a simplified employee plan is adopted, 
simplified employee plans appear to be an inappropriate 
substitute for high-cost qualified plan alternatives.
In many states, state income tax policies have such a 
distorting effect on plan cost that simplified employee 
plans are at least as costly as the qualified plan 
alternatives examined.
Because simplified employee plans were assumed to 
have no administration costs, the cost advantage of 
adopting a simplified employee plan, instead of a 
high-cost qualified plan, seems doubtful. If the 
administration costs of simplif ed employee plans are 
later found to be greater than zero, perhaps because of 
hidden costs not contemplated by this study, simplified 
employee plans may turn out to be more costly than, 
even, high-cost qualified plan alternatives.
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Based on the evidence presented earlier In this 
chapter, a fair conclusion is that, at best, congress 
failed to achieve its purpose in creating simplified 
employee plans. In fact, such an evaluation may be too 
generous; arguably, Congress achieved the opposite of 
what was intended: by creating simplified employee
plans, Congress may have provided small employers with a 
tempting alternative that produces less retirement 
benefits per dollar of employer contribution than 
retirement plan alternatives that might otherwise have 
been adopted by small employers.
Because of the added consideration of competitive 
advantages among states, proposing sound recommendations 
or deriving logical conclusions about policy effects at 
the state level is especially tricky business . 4 1  In 
general, those states that do not tax plan 
distributions have the lowest average plan cost. This 
result was expected and served as a benchmark for the 
effects of other state tax policies. The tax benefits 
available to participants in qualified retirement 
arrangements are so extensive that a simplified employee 
plan is the most costly method of providing retirement 
benefits in a large number of states. In other states, 
simplified employee plans offer only limited cost
4 ^Such factors could, conceivably, have
consequences at the federal level as well.
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reduction over the most complex, and most costly in 
terms of administration cost, qualified plan 
alternatives, when compared to less complex qualified 
plans, for example, defined contribution plans, 
simplified employee plans offer no cost advantage in any 
state category.
The implications for Congress are that, first, the 
administration cost reduction available from simplified 
employee plans is not adequate to overcome the tax 
benefits available to qualified plans. If Congress's 
purpose is to put more retirement benefits into the 
hands of employees, simplified employee plan 
distributions should receive at least some of the tax 
relief given to qualified plan alternatives. Second, 
states significantly distort the relative cost of paying 
after-tax dollars to employees in all of the retirement 
arrangements examined, although determining the 
practical effects of this distortion is a very 
difficult tas k . 4 2
If simplified employee plans are to be used as a 
vehicle for encouraging retirement benefit payments, the 
federal incentive, that is, cost reduction by means of 
plan administration simplification, is insufficient to 
overcome, completely, the effects of state income
42See Chapters 2 and 3 for a general discussion of 
selected studies and possible effects of interstate tax 
differentials.
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taxation. Again, the apparent solution is to extend at 
least some of the tax relief currently available to 
qualified plans to simplified employee plans.
The implications of this study to individual 
states, and groups of states, is less clear than the 
implications at the national level. Rather than 
indicating a shortcoming of this study, the preceding 
statement reflects the complexity of state tax policy 
issues and the difficulty of predicting the effects of 
changes in state income tax policies.
Assuming that the current federal rules for 
retirement arrangement taxation continue, states that 
currently do not tax qualified plan distributions, may 
wish to consider taxing such distributions if state 
revenue is a primary consideration. Because these 
states now offer the lowest cost alternative, there 
might be little lost, in the way of a competitive edge 
over other states, if a state income tax were imposed on 
all, or some, plan distributions. state tax revenue 
considerations would, of course, have to be balanced 
against social goals such as providing an adequate 
standard of living for retired residents and, in states 
that do not tax other sources of income, problems of 
horizontal tax equity.
States that currently tax all distributions as 
ordinary income do not appear to be at the competitive
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disadvantage that might be expected. As an additional 
benefit, they achieve a degree of horizontal tax equity, 
among simplified employee plans, qualified plans, and 
other sources of income, not present at the federal 
level.
Through a combination of higher, more progressive 
tax rates and more complex taxing schemes, MIX states, 
in general, cause benefits to be more heavily taxed than 
similar benefits in NT and 01 states. This suggests 
that states, especially MIX states, may want to 
reevaluate their policies for taxing retirement 
arrangement distributions. By adopting a hybrid method 
of taxing plan distributions, MIX states may have 
attempted to give preferential treatment to certain 
types of distributions, but the effect, when compared to 
other states, may be to tax these distributions more 
heavily. Again, policy changes in these states would 
require close examination of the effects of a change on 
other state goals.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study relied heavily upon two assumptions 
about lump sum distributions paid to the employees of 
small businesses. The first assumption was that 
retirement plan costs incurred by employers are affected 
by the federal and state taxes imposed on employees.
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The second assumption concerns the definition of small 
employers, the intended beneficiaries of simplified 
employee plans.
To the extent that the assumptions employed were 
not appropriate, the conclusions which can be drawn from 
the results of this study are limited. For the reasons 
stated in earlier chapters, the assumptions and 
limitations appear appropriate for the purposes of this 
study.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Recent federal legislative trends have run counter 
to the proposals in this chapter. Instead of 
attempting to make simplified employee plans more 
efficient as a means of putting after-tax benefits into 
the hands of employees, qualified plans have been made 
less efficient. For example, some qualified plan 
participants are no longer eligible to use the federal 
ten year averaging method to compute the tax on a lump 
sum plan distribution and, instead, are required to use 
a less advantageous five year averaging method. The 
group to which this restriction applies will grow in 
coming years, and the effect of this shift certainly 
will be of interest to federal and state policy-makers.
Individual states may find that they are able to 
benefit from a closer examination of plan costs in their
own state and in neighboring states. Many of the 
assumptions of this study were based on data collected 
at the national level. Using regional or state data 
may allow more precise cost calculations for specific 
regions or states.
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